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Ship development throughout history has been erratic, having
been extremely slow during some periods and surprisingly fast at other
times. Resistance to technological advances has retarded many ship im-
provements. The United States throughout its maritime history has shown
great foresight with innovations and technological improvements, but
then failed to carry on their development, leaving others to reap the
advantages of these developments. The nation has failed to provide our
merchant marine the steady attention it should receive. Our impressive
periods were those when circumstances seemed most severe and unfavorable.
Our too frequent lapses have been caused not by opposition, but by loss
of interest, indifference, and attention to other things.
This is a time when ship development is proceeding rapidly.
World trade has been expanding as a result of population growth and in-
dustrialization of underdeveloped countries. To meet this expanding
trade, the productivity of ships has been increased. This has been ac-
complished by an increase in ship's speed and size along with innovations
in cargo handling such as containerization, the LASH system, and the
intermodial concept.
The increase in speed and size has necessitated an increase in
the power required. However, improvements in marine power plants have
not kept pace with improvements in the other areas. Although marine
nuclear propulsion has been in use since the launching of the U.S.S.
NAUTILUS, there is not a nuclear powered U.S. merchant ship in service
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today. The reason for this is mainly economic. In the past, with the
low power levels and low fossil fuel cost, the higher capital cost of
the nuclear power plant has not been outweighed by lower nuclear fuel
cost. However, with the higher power requirements and higher fossil
fuel cost today and in the future, serious consideration must be given
to nuclear propulsion systems.
This paper will compare the economic aspects of one application
of marine nuclear propulsion. Chosen for this study was the Sea-Land
Service containership SL-7 , a modern, high speed, high horsepower,
quick turn around vessel.
It is the objective of this study to make as few assumptions as
feasible, while at the same time presenting as realistic a situation as
possible. Because the nuclear propulsion system is the challenger, all
data will be conservatively chosen to favor the fossil fueled ship. Most
areas of expense will be examined and appropriate values assigned. Two
separate economic criteria will be used to analyze the ships so as not
to inadvertently favor one or the other alternative through inappropri-




The era of commercial steam navigation began with the launching
of Robert Fulton's CLERMONT in 1807. In 1819 the steam auxiliary powered
sailing ship SAVANNAH made the first transatlantic passage using her en-
gine 80 hours out of the 29-day voyage from Savannah, Georgia to Liver-
pool, England. However, that was the last to be heard of the American
pioneering effort in the application of marine steam propulsion. It was
left to the British to develop and refine steam propulsion, and in so
doing, to dominate world merchant shipping for over 75 years.
Another new era in marine propulsion began with the launching of
the N.S. SAVANNAH in July, 1959, the era of commercial marine nuclear
propulsion. The ship was constructed by the government as a result of
a proposal by President Eisenhower as part of his Atoms for Peace
Program.
The SAVANNAH was operated by the State Marine Line from May,
1962 until March, 1963. As the result of a labor dispute, a new general
agent, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, was named. In 1964, the ship
made her first transatlantic crossing. After steaming 89,818 miles and
visiting 46 ports on demonstration voyages, she was placed in commercial
service in August, 1965. By July, 1970 the SAVANNAH had carried cargo on
a commercial basis to 37 foreign and 13 domestic ports, and had sailed to
the Far East three times. The ship had made a total of 737 reactor
start-ups, steamed 454,675 miles with a reactor plant at sea availability
of 99.8%, meeting all advanced schedules without a single plant failure.,
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Although she was not designed to be economically competitive,
the SAVANNAH program did accomplish the following:
1. Proved the technical feasibility and safety of a nuclear
powered merchant ship.
2. Won acceptance at home and in most foreign ports.
3. Demonstrated the capability of a nuclear powered ship to
maintain schedules.
4. Established a servicing facility for future nuclear powered
ships at Galveston, Texas.
5. Established a training program for future ship operators.
6. Made practical the development of numerous technical studies
to explore the future use of nuclear propulsion.,
7. Provided knowledge concerning the economics of nuclear ships-
By 1971 the SAVANNAH had achieved her mission. Because she was
not economically competitive, Congress was unwilling to continue support-
ing her operation. She has thus been taken out of service.
As a result, the only remaining nuclear powered merchant ship in
operation was the German ore carrier, N„S. OTTO HAHN. This ship was
built in 1968 with the Babcock and Wilcox designed CNSG I (Consolidated
Nuclear Steam Generator) licensed to Germany in 1966. By mid 1970 the
OTTO HAHN had steamed over 70,000 miles with a reactor plant at sea avail-
ability of almost 100%. She demonstrated the suitability of the CNSG
design for marine propulsion.
Both Germany and Japan are vigorously pursuing a nuclear mer-
chant ship development program. The U.S. Maritime Administration is
sponsoring the development by Babcock and Wilcox and General Electric
of a complete nuclear propulsion system with a scheduled completion date
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in the summer of 1973. However, there are not at present any plans for
the construction of an American nuclear powered merchant ship. The
question must then be asked if the name SAVANNAH will represent another





To make a selection between opposing transport systems neces-
sarily requires the selection of proper economic criteria. The criteria
must take into account the true cost of money to the company making the
decision, the effect of taxes, both State and Federal, and the particular
systems under consideration, while at the same time making as few assump-
tions as possible.
Because this paper is a comparison of propulsion systems for use
in essentially the same ship, the revenue produced by each ship will be
equal. Thus, the profit will be the greatest over the ship's life when
the total cost of operating the ship over its life is the minimum. The
alternative with the lowest average annual cost is then the one that will
provide the highest profit, and therefore is the most desirable from an
economic standpoint.
Average Annual Cost
The average annual cost (AAC) or required average annual revenue
to operate the system includes the daily operating costs, the cost of
capital recovery, corporate profit taxes, both State and Federal, and an
after-tax profit. The average annual cost is then: 1
AAC = Average annual cost
AAOC = Average annual operating cost
CC = Construction cost at the start of operations
CRF(x,DT) = Capital recovery factor, including taxes, at
rate x, for DT years
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x = Effective cost of money
n = Life of the ship in years
DT = Time in which the ship is depreciated
CAOC = Cumulative present worth of the annual
operating costs at the start of operations
CRF'(x,n) = The capital recovery factor, excluding taxes,
at rate x for n years
AOC(t) = Annual operating cost for year t
PWF(x,t) = Present worth factor at rate x for t years
AAC = AAOC + (CC)CRF(x,DT) (3-1)
The value of the AAOC is obtained as follows:
AAOC = (CAOC)CRF'(x,n) (See Figure 3-1) (3-2)
Cumulative Annual Operating Cost
Average Annual Operating Cost




CAOC = jTAOC(t)PWF(x,t) (See Figure 3-2) (3-3)
t
* Cumulative Annual Operating Cost
At
A0C(1) A0C(6)







Application of the Present Worth Factor
FIGURE 3-2
The present worth factor can be obtained from tables or
calculated as follows:
PWF(x,t) = (1 + x) _t (3-4)
Construction Cost
The value of CC is obtained by summing the present worth, at the
start of operations, of all individual construction cost payments, over
the time of construction:
CAF(x,t) = The compound amount factor a rate x for time t
ICC(t) = Individual construction cost payment at time t
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Application of the Compound Amount Factor
FIGURE 3-3
The compound amount factor can be obtained from tables or com-
puted using:
CAF(x,t) = (1 + x) fc
By defining all time prior to the start of operations as negative and
all time subsequent to the start of operations as positive, CC can then
be defined as follows:
CC ICC(t)PWF(x,t)
In the above equation t is negative.
Capital Recovery Factor
The capital recovery factor, CRF'(x,t), is a number that when
multiplied by the present value of some quantity, such as a mortgage or
the value of a ship, will result in the average annual return required,
at rate x for t years, to pay off the mortgage. The CRF'(x,t) assumes
no salvage value and does not include income taxes.
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The CRF'(x,t) can be derived by summing the present worth, at
time t = o, of the average annual return over time t, then proceeding
as follows:
P = Present value of the mortgage or ship
R' = Average annual return required after taxes have been
deducted
R = Average annual return before taxes have been deducted
n = Life of the ship in years
r = Effective income tax rate
P = (R')PWF(x,l) + (R')PWF(x,2) + (R»)PWF(x,3)
+ ... + (R»)PWF(x,t)
Let wc = PWF(x,t) = (1 + x) -t
P = R'w + R'w2 + R'w3 + ... + R'wt
P = R*w(l + w + w2 + w3 + ... + wt -1 )
Multiplying both sides of the equation by w:
wP = R'w(w + w2 + w3 + ... + wt)
Subtracting
wP - P = R f w(wt - 1)
R' = 1 - w = x
P w(l - w fc ) 1-(1 + x) _t
Then by definition of the capital recovery factor:
CRF'(x,t) = R' = x
P 1 -(1 + x)- fc ( 3_7 )
The CRF'(x,t) must now be modified to account for the added
cost of income taxes so that the resulting average annual return is
large enough to include all the cost included in R' plus income taxes.
The CFR'(x,t) will be modified as follows: 3
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Assuming a straight line depreciation for tax purposes, the de-
preciation would equal P/n.
Annual taxes equal the tax rate times the annual return before
taxes less the depreciation:
Annual Taxes = r(R - P/n)
R = R' + Annual Taxes
R = R' + r(R - P/n)
R = R' - rP/n
1 - r
R = R'/P - r/n
P 1 - r
CRF(x,t) = CRF'(x,t) - r/n
1 - r (3-8)










R' = Revenue after taxes *
— R = Revenue before taxes "
= R' + r(R - P/n)
Taxes






To obtain the true cost of money, x, the capitalization struc-
ture of the company must be considered. Capital is raised through
borrowing from a bank or other institution, the sale of bonds, and the
sale of stocks. The bank loan and bonds require a certain interest rate
of return. To be able to sell stock requires the company to have a suf-
ficiently high equity return rate to make the investment attractive to
the public. The direct cost of money can then be represented as:
a = Direct cost of money
j = The bank or bond interest rate
b = Debt to capital ratio for the company
i = Equity return rate after corporate taxes have been
deducted
a = jb + i (1 - b)
The effective cost of money is then the direct cost of money
less the savings in income tax due to the deductible nature of the in-
terest on the bank loans or bonds :
x = jb + i(l - b) - jbr (3-9)
r = Effective income tax rate
The value of r is derived for a Pennsylvania corporation as
follows: 5
FIT = Federal Income Tax
SIT = State Income Tax
TIF = Taxable Income Federal
TIS = Taxable Income State
NOLD = Net Operating Loss Deduction
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FIT = .48 (TIF - NOLD) - $6,500.00
SIT = .12(TIS)
TIS = TIF + SIT
SIT = .12 (TIF + SIT)
SIT = ,136364(TIF)
Total Income Tax = FIT + SIT
Total Income Tax = .616364 (TIF) -.48NOLD - $6,500
If the company suffers no net operating loss, and if the TIF is




To calculate the average annual operating cost, AAOC, requires
the calculation of each year's operating cost, AOC. The AOC includes
the fuel cost. For the fossil fueled ship the fuel cost is simply add-
ed to the other costs for the year to obtain the AOC. However, nuclear
fuel costs involve more detailed computations for the core is a large
capital investment that will depreciate over a lifetime of approximately
four to five years, and will have a salvage value. To determine the
average annual cost of the fuel over its operating lifetime requires the
following modification to the capital recovery factor to account for the
cores salvage value:
Zq = Cost of fuel at start up
Z = Value of fuel at shut down
Li
CRFS'(x,n) = Capital recovery factor with a salvage value
excluding taxes, at rate x for n years
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AF' = Average annual fuel cost excluding taxes
L = Life of the core in years
Performing the same sequence of steps as done in the derivation
of equation (3-7) :
ZQ = (AF')PWF(x,l) + (AF*)PWF(x,2) + . .. +
(AF')PWF(x,L) + (ZL)PWF(x,L)




= AF'(1 - wL ) + z L
x
L







1-(1 + x) _L L
AF' = (Z - ZT )CRF(x,L) + xZO L
AF 1





CRFS'(x,L) = CRF'(x,L) + xZL
z„ - z TO L
(3-11)
Because the core is a capital investment, corporate taxes must
be included in the average annual cost. This will be accomplished by
performing the same sequence of steps as in the derivation of equation
(3-8)
:
AF = Average annual fuel cost including taxes
CRFS(x,L) = Capital recovery factor with a salvage value
including taxes
The straight line depreciation equals (Z - Z
T
) /L
Annual Taxes = r(AF - (ZQ - ZL ) /L)
AF = AF' + Annual Taxes
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AF = AF' _ r(ZQ - ZL )





L (l-r)(Zo -ZL ) L(l - r)
CRFS(x,L) = CRFS'(x,L) , r
1 - r L(l - r) (3-12)
AF = (Z - Z )CRFS(x,L)
The preceding criteria will provide an accurate comparison be-
tween the alternative power plants under discussion, for the criteria
includes all the important factors that effect the cost of operating the
ships, while at the same time requiring as few assumptions as possible.
The data assumed for this study is listed in Table 3-1. A
sensitivity analysis will be performed by varying different parameters
around this base data.
Table 3-1
ECONOMIC DATA
i = After tax equity return = .12
j = Interest rate = .09
b = Debt to capital ratio = .75
r = Effective income tax rate = .616364
Average Annual Net Profit
To insure that the average annual cost criteria does not favor
either alternative, a second criteria, the average annual net profit
(AANP) , will also be employed. Although this requires additional assump-
tions, in that the revenue generated by the ship must be predicted, the
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criteria is necessary to observe the effect of the lost revenue that re-
sults when the nuclear powered ship is refueled. The average annual net
profit is derived as follows:
AANP = Average annual net profit
ANP(t) = Annual net profit, year t
TI(t) = Taxable income, year t
RPY(t) = Revenue per year, year t
AOC(t) = Annual operating cost, year t
DA = Straight line depreciation
J(t) = Total interest payment, year t
RPC = Revenue per container
CPV = Containers carried per voyage
VPY = Number of voyages per year
AANP = CRF'(x,n)^ANP(t)PWF(x,t)
ANP(t) = TI(t)(l - r)
TI(t) = RPY(t) - AOC(t) - DA - J(t)
RPY(t) = (RPC) (CPV) (VPY)
DA = CC/DT




In order to conform to the objective of minimizing the number of
assumptions, it was necessary to use an existing containership and to
modify it as required to accommodate the nuclear power plant. The ship
chosen was the SL-7 design of Sea-Land Service, Inc. Eight of these
ships are under construction or in operation. The SL-7 is a modern,
high horsepower, high speed, 33 knot, fast turn around containership.
The ship has twin-screw, steam turbine propulsion. Each screw is turned
by a 60,000 SHP cross compounded turbine connected through a double re-
duction gear. Each turbine is supplied by a boiler producing steam at
850 psig and 955 degrees Fahrenheit.
Electrical power generating equipment consists of two 3,000 KW
turbine driven generators, one 1,500 KW standby diesel generator, and
one 60 KW emergency diesel generator.
The containers are carried in fifteen groups of container cells
in five holds forward and four holds aft of the engine room. All cells
will accommodate 35 ft. containers. In addition, the hold immediately
forward of the engine room can carry 40 ft. containers. The hatches are
designed to carry containers three tiers high. The two forward holds
will not carry containers, but are suitable for general cargo or
vehicles 6 .
The design of the ship is such that water ballast is required
for stability under most load conditions . When underway, the fuel oil
consumed must be replaced by water ballast. To meet the increasing

18.
pollution control requirements, separate tanks are used for the fuel oil
and water ballast. Because of this the ship cannot carry sufficient fuel
oil to operate on Trade Route 12 (East Coast of the United States to the
Far East) at design speed. However, the ship can and probably will op-
erate on Trade Route 4 (East Coast of the United States to the West
Coast of the United States to the Far East)
.
The Nuclear Powered Ship
The nuclear version of the SL-7 will be designated as the SL-7N
for this study.
To adapt the SL-7 for nuclear propulsion will require some modi-
fications to accommodate the nuclear power plant and to meet American
Bureau of Shipping and United States Coast Guard requirements.
According to the American Bureau of Shipping' Sj Guide for
Classification of Nuolear Ships, Chapter 2-4, "The ship should be ca-
pable of remaining afloat with positive stability when two adjacent
main watertight compartments are flooded."
The SL-7 does not meet this requirement for the machinery space
.
If the machinery space and an adjacent compartment are flooded, the ship
loses positive stability. To meet the two compartment standard for the
SL-7N, the machinery space will be divided into two compartments, the
reactor compartment and the engine room.
The SL-7N will also be propelled by two 60,000 SHP cross com-
pounded turbines connected through double reduction gears to their
respective shafts. Electrical power will be supplied by two 3,000 KW
turbine drive generators . However, the steam supplied will be only
slightly superheated at 575 degrees Fahrenheit and 700 psi. This will
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require larger turbines and a moisture separator to be located between
the high and low pressure units of the main turbines. In addition, to
meet in port safety requirements, a means of moving the ship without the
reactor is required. This is accomplished by providing two 1,500 HP
electric motors, one connected through a coupling to each reduction
gear. Power to these motors will be provided by two stand-by diesel
generators.
The machinery space on the SL-7 is 115 ft. long. The length re-
quired to accommodate the nuclear steam supply system, the larger steam
turbines, the additional diesel generator and the other components not
found on the SL-7 requires a machinery space 140 ft. in length,.
The additional length, with sufficient height to accommodate
the machinery, is obtained by the relocation of the two lower rows of
containers in hold 9. These twenty containers can be located on the
main deck above the reactor compartment in the space on the SL-7 occu-
pied by the upper portion of the machinery casing and the uptakes. This
will require some rearrangement of the aft house. Actually thirty to
forty containers can be accommodated in this space, however, since this
study is based on equal transport capacity, only twenty containers will
be carried. See Figure 4-1.
The nuclear steam supply system to be used in this study is the
Babcock and Wilcox, Consolidated Nuclear Steam Generator (CNSG IV) de-
sign shown in Figure 4-2. The unitized design was selected over the
loop type plant used on the SAVANNAH for the following reasons:
1. The amount of space required is reduced.
2, The primary system is smaller therefore the weight of
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3. Because there are no loops through which to pump the pri-
mary coolant, the pumping power requirements are reduced.
4„ With no large pipes to rupture, the unitized design is in-
herently safer, and the safety injection system required is
smaller.
5. Radioactive contamination of the system should be less of a
problem because there are fewer places for radioactive cor-
rosion products to deposit.
6. Decay heat removal problems are reduced because natural
circulation is possible.
This design has been achieved at the expense of a larger, thicker walled
pressure vessel. However, this pressure vessel is well within the capa-
bility of modern fabrication technology.
In the CNSG design the primary coolant flow is entirely within
the reactor pressure vessel. The coolant flows up through the core,
where it is heated to about 600 degrees Fahrenheit, to a canned motor
driven pump, then it is discharged down through the steam generator,
where it is cooled, and back to the core. To keep the primary coolant
from boiling requires that the primary system be maintained at 1,850 psig,
This is accomplished by use of a separate pressurizer in which electric
heaters maintain saturation conditions for 1,850 psig.
The pressure vessel and pressurizer are completely enclosed by
the containment vessel. The containment vessel is capable of containing
the steam produced by any conceivable rupture of the primary system
which might release radioactivity to the environment. A vapor pressure
suppression pool is located within the containment vessel and helps re-
duce the peak pressure seen by the containment in case of a rupture.
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This pool also serves as primary shielding to protect personnel against
radiation from the core.
Additional shielding surrounds the containment vessel and con-
sists of lead, concrete, steel, and polyethelene.
The unitized design is a proven concept that has been in use
for over three years on the OTTO HAHN and has shown an at sea relia-
bility of almost 100%.
In addition to the two compartment requirement, a collision
barrier is also required. One of the major safety problems resulting
from the use of a nuclear power plant at sea is the potential collision
with another vessel causing penetration of the primary system resulting
in the release of radioactive material to the environment. To preclude
this possibility some means of preventing the striking ship from pen-
etrating the reactor compartment is required. The collision barrier is
the solution.
The American Bureau of Shipping has developed interim specific
requirements for collision barrier design. The barrier consists of re-
inforced transverse bulkheads, longitudinal bulkheads, decks, flats, and
the double bottom. The design of the SL-7N collision barrier requires
heavy plating, up to three inches thick, to be part of the main hull
structure. Vertically, reinforced flats are arranged at selected lo-
cations. These reinforced flats with the required supports and the
foundation of the reactor compartment make an extremely stiff structure*
Advantage will be taken of the additional structural support
required for the collision barrier and containment vessel to provide
a secondary containment to house the nuclear steam supply system. This
will provide additional leaktightness in the event of a nuclear accident,
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The enclosure will consist of the forward transverse bulkhead of the
machinery space, the transverse bulkhead between the reactor compart-
ment and the engine room which was added to meet the two compartment
damage control requirement, and the addition of two longitudinal bulk-
heads on either side of the secondary shielding.
Foundation design will be similar to, but heavier than that for
the SL-7 because of the larger turbines, the additional diesel generator,
and the two electric propulsion motors. The major increase in foundation
weight is that required for the pressure vessel and containment. Also,
protection must be designed into the foundation and inner bottom to
minimize the possibility of piercing the containment or seriously dis-
placing nuclear components in the event of grounding.
Table 4-1 lists the ship characteristics. It will be noticed
that the combined lightship displacement plus fuel oil capacity for the
SL-7 exceeds the lightship displacement of the SL-7N by 2598 LT. If the
ship was specifically designed for nuclear propulsion, advantage could
be taken of this difference in displacement by reducing the draft or in-
creasing the cargo capacity. However, since stability problems might
arise with this particular ship, it is assumed that the SL-7N will be
required to take on water ballast and to maintain the same draft as the
SL-7.
Figures 4-3 and 4-4 show the Power vs. Speed and the Fuel Con-






Length, Overall 946.6 ft. 946.6 ft.
Length, Between Perpendiculars 880.5 ft. 880.5 ft.
Beam, Molded 105.5 ft. 105.5 ft.
Depth to Main Deck (Fwd) 64.0 ft. 64.0 ft.
Depth to Main Deck (Aft) 68.5 ft. 68.5 ft.
Draft, Full Load 33.0 ft. 33.0 ft.
Structural Steel 17,640 LT 17,800 LT*
Machinery 3,310 LT** 2,340 LT
NSSS 1,160 LT
Containment and Shielding 1,340 LT
Collision Barrier 1,200 LT
Outfit 2,440 LT 2,440 LT
Lightship Displacement 23,390 LT 26,280 LT
Fuel Capacity (100%) 5,488 LT
Displacement (Full Load) 48,500 LT 48,500 LT
Cargo Deadweight 21,000 LT 21,000 LT
Diesel Oil 170 LT 340 LT
Stores 100 LT 100 LT
Crew Effects 5 LT 5 LT
* Includes reactor compartment bulkheads less part of aft deck
house removed.
** Includes boilers and support equipment.

530 LT 530 LT
9,561 LT 9,561 LT
120,000 120,000
2 2








Electrical Power (2) 3,000 KW-TG (2) 3,000 KW-TG
(1) 1,500 KW-DG (2) 2,000 KW-DG
Container Capacity (8 ft. by 8.5 ft, by 35 ft.)
On Deck 402*** 422***
In Cells 694 674
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The acquisition cost includes the cost of construction and the
owner's pre-delivery cost such as crew training. The construction costs
are based on the estimated cost of the SL-7 proposed by General Dynamics
in 1968. The costs are escalated at 3% per year for materials and 6%
per year for labor. All costs are based on a three ship purchase.
The cost of the hull and machinery for the SL-7N are based on
the SL-7 costs and the method of cost estimating outlined in Ref. 7.
The nuclear stream supply system cost is based on vendor estimates.
Construction Cost
Construction costs are divided into the following categories:
Hull Structure and Outfit - This includes all hull structure and super-
structure with all internal divisional bulkheads. For the SL-7N this
includes the collision barrier, the secondary shielding and containment
vessel. Outfit items include deck machinery, deck fittings, anchors,
windlass, rudder, steering gear, hull piping, and galley equipment.
Machinery - This includes the entire propulsion system from the boilers
to the propellers plus auxiliary equipment. The nuclear machinery does
not include the nuclear steam supply system,
Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) - This includes the cost of the re-
actor vessel and internals, pumps, control systems, and auxiliary equip-
ment, excluding the core which is covered under fuel cost, delivered to
the shipyard. This item does not include installation cost, which is

included under machinery labor cost.
































* Includes the collision barrier, secondary shielding, and
containment
.
** Includes the installation cost of the NSSS.
Construction Schedule
The construction schedules for the SL-7 and SL-7N are listed in
Table 5-2. The schedule for the SL-7 is based on their actual construc-
tion schedule of from eighteen to twenty-four months. The time for




installation of the collision barrier, shielding and other additional
fabrication. The fifty month manufacturing time for the nuclear steam














Start Complete Start Complete
3/75 9/75 1/73 6/73
6/73 8/77
9/75 8/77 6/75 8/77
3/76 9/77 9/75 9/77
6/77 8/77
8/77 9/77 8/77 9/77
9/77 11/77 9/77 11/77
1/78 1/78
Because there have been numerous delays in the construction of
utility company nuclear power plants due primarily to environmental
questions, the construction time for the SL-7N will be lengthened to
observe its effect on costs. It is believed, however, that the pres-
ent delays in utility company construction will be overcome with the
revamping of licensing procedure and the reorganization of the Atomic
Energy Commission to handle its increased responsibility in the
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environmental area. Therefore, these delays should not effect the
SL-7N.
The shipbuilder and power plant vendors receive progress pay-
ments based on the percentage of completion. The purchaser retains 10%
of the cost as a guarantee against meeting specifications until the
guarantee period, which is assumed to be one year for the ship, and two
years for the power plant, is over. The pre-delivery payments will be
based on a straight line approximation with payments at six month inter-
vals. These payments will be brought forward to ship delivery using the
present worth techniques discussed in Chapter III. The construction
cost will then be amortized over a twenty year period.




Years Before % of Years Before % of
Ship Delivery Total Cost Plant Delivery Total Cost
-1.33 22.5 -1.75 18.0
-
.83 22.5 -1.25 18.0
-
.33 22.5 - .75 18.0
0.0 22.5 - .25 18.0







Years Before % of Years Before % of
Ship Deliv ery Total Cost NSSS Delivery Total Cost
-1.75 18.0 -4.0 10.0
-1.25 18.0 -3.5 10.0
-
.75 18.0 -3.0 10.0
- .25 18.0 -2.5 10.0





























Prior to ship delivery the crew must operate the ship during
tests and sea trials and must be trained to do so. It is asssumed that
the crew is experienced with steam propulsion plants, and that the offi-
cers on the SL-7N have received training in nuclear propulsion such as
is offered at the Merchant Marine Academy.
For the SL-7N it is assumed that the entire engineering depart-
ment excluding wipers will be assembled one year prior to delivery to
begin training and licensing. The training period will last eight months
and is estimated to cost about $300,000. The crew cost, which includes
wages and benefits, during this training period would be $312,000.
Only a limited number of engineering department personnel on the
SL-7 are assembled six months prior to ship delivery. They include the
chief engineer, first assistant, second assistant and three third class
assistants. The training period will last two months and will cost
about $50,000. The crew cost during this period will be $36,000,
During the tests and sea trials phase, the entire crew will be
assembled . The crew cost for this four month period would be:
SL-7 $ 600,000
SL-7N $ 612,000






To keep the ship at sea, the owner has a number of expenses in
addition to amortization payments and fuel cost. These expenses are
discussed below and summarized in Table 6-3. Ref. 8 provided basic
cost data for many items in this chapter.
Crew Cost
The crew of the SL-7 will consist of eighteen deck, nineteen
engineering and thirteen steward department personnel. The average
crew cost including officer and crew wages, subsistence, and fringe
benefits in 1971 for Sea-Land was $70 per day plus an additional 50%
for overtime9 . The yearly crew cost in 1971 for the SL-7 would have
been $1,916,250.
The crew of the SL-7N will be increased by one for the engi-
neering department. The additional man will be required to handle
health physics and water chemistry functions. Similar studies to this
one have generally considered that four additional men would be required.
However, this was based on a thirteen man engineering force. Because of
the nineteen men on the SL-7, only one additional man is required for
the SL-7N. The yearly crew cost for the SL-7N is then $1,954,575.
The Office of Maritime Manpower has published data showing that
crew wages have risen an average of 6% per year since 1949. This rate
of increase is assumed for the life of the ship. The yearly crew cost
for the SL-7 in 1978 would then be $2,881,274 and for the SL-7N $2,938,899
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Stores. Supplies and Equipment
This item includes the cost of all consumable stores, supplies
and equipment used in maintaining the hull and machinery. For the SL-7
this cost is estimated to be $300 per day in 1978. Using the cost ex-
perience of the N.S. SAVANNAH, the projected cost in 1978 for the SL-7N
would be $350 per day. This item will be escalated at 3% per year to
account for the increasing cost of material.
Maintenance and Repair
Those expenses not covered by insurance which includes repairs
to the hull and machinery are included here. Table 6-1 lists these
items and the projected cost for 1978.
The Nuclear Steam Supply System maintenance and repair costs
are estimated from data on land-based plants to be about .2 mills per
SHP/hr in 1967. Using a cost escalation of 4% per year, the 1978
annual maintenance cost would be $200,000.
All items in this category are escalated at 4% per year to ac-
count for increases in labor and material cost.
Table 6-1











Protection and Indemnity - This insurance protects the company against
lawsuits involving the crew, third party, fixed objects, and cargo. This
coverage includes:
Crew - Protects against liability as the result of injury
or death of an employee.
Third Party - Protects against liability as the result of
injury to persons other than employees who board the ship.
This includes longshoremen, maintenance men, etc.
Fixed Object - Protects against damage to piers, navigation
aids and other fixed objects.
Cargo - Protects against liabilities relative to damage or
loss of cargo.
The cost of this insurance is principally related to the number
of crew members, and for 1978 is estimated to be $6.34/man/day. For the
SL-7 the annual premium is $115,705 and for the SL-7N it is $118,019.
Protection and indemnity premiums are escalated at 3% per year.
Hull and Machinery - This insurance protects the company from damage or
loss of the vessel and is proportional to the value of the ship. The
annual premium is estimated to be $10,000 + .007 times the ship's value.
The decrease in ship value tends to offset the increase in material and
labor cost for repairs and therefore the premium will not be escalated.
War Risk - This insurance becomes effective when the company's normal
insurance is terminated at the outbreak of war. It includes protection
and indemnity as well as hull insurance. A war risk binder of $250 per
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year is carried. This study will assume that war risk insurance is not
in effect and therefore will not be considered.
Third Party Nuclear Liability - This insurance is required to protect
the company in the event of an accident that results in the release of
radioactive materials that cause injury or death to third parties. By
projecting the effect of the release of all the radioactive material in
a core, which is a very improbable occurance, the resulting loss of life
could be tremendous. The amount of third party liability protection re-
quired is therefore extensive. Because private insurance companies
could not provide all of the coverage, Congress passed the Price-Ander-
son Act in 1957 to assist utilities in the development of nuclear power
plants. The Act provided for government indemnity in excess of available
private insurance. In the years since passage, no claim involving in-
demnity has been received, and a high percentage of the premiums for
private insurance that have been held in reserve are being refunded. A
limit of $500,000,000 of government indemnification was originally es-
tablished. This is gradually being reduced as the amount of available
private insurance increases. As the Act now stands, it will continue
until 1977.
The total amount of insurance now required is $560,000,000;
$95,000,000 being supplied by private insurance groups and the remainder
by the government. The premium required is broken down as shown in
Table 6-2. The total private plus government premium is $359,670 per
year. It will be assumed for this study that Price-Anderson protection





























This includes all expenses not covered under other categories
and is estimated to be $20,000 per year, and to escalate at 3% per
year.
Cargo Expenses
Those expenses associated with the storage and handling of
cargo. Sea-Land estimates a cost in 1971 of $50 per container. The 1978
cost is estimated to be $100 per container per transit. This item will
be escalated at 3% per year to account for that part of the cost
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associated with labor. Terminal rents are contracted on a long term
basis and will not be escalated.
Administrative and Overhead
The Maritime Administration has compiled data that shows this
expense can be directly related to voyage expenses. It includes the
cost of management, communications, advertising, survey fees and other
expenses not directly accountable to a specific ship. The cost in 1966
was found to average 13% of total voyage expense. This percentage will
be used, and since voyage expenses escalate, no separate escalation
will be applied to administrative and overhead expenses.
Shore Staff
The nuclear ships will require several people to be included in
the shore staff that are not included in the administrative expenses
for the conventional ship. This would include a nuclear engineer and a
health physicist plus additional training of the existing shore staff.
This additional cost is estimated to be for 1978 at $50,000, and to es-
calate at 6% per year. Table 6-3 shows a summary of the annual opera-



































To comply with the criteria specified in the objective of this
study requires that a trade route be chosen which is practical and is in
actual use or is planned to be used in the near future. The trade
route chosen is the one that Sea-Land intends to use for the first of
their SL-7's and is on the North Atlantic run, from New York to Rotter-
dam, to Bremerhaven and then back to New York. A schedule based on

41.
weekly, same day arrivals and departures with minimum in port time is
proposed. In port time is dependent on the time to unload and load con-
tainers and to fuel the conventional ship. With the modern container-
ship facilities now in existence at these ports, Sea-Land reports that
one crane can cycle, that is unload and load, fifteen containers per
hour without delays, and that they use three to five cranes per ship.
With a 1/3 time allowance for delays, between 720 and 1,200 containers
can be cycled per day.
The schedule to be used, Table 6-4, assumes that all containers
will be cycled in New York in one day, and that 60% will be cycled in
Rotterdam and 40% in Bremerhaven. Resulting in a total of two days re-
quired per voyage for cargo handling. An additional day in port will
be included to account for any delays such as maintenance and inspec-
tions. This time is added to the time in New York, however, it could
be spent in any of the ports as required.
An adjustment is made to account for bottom fouling by assuming
a .5 knot penalty. That is, only 32.5 knots are obtained at 100% power
instead of the designed 33 knots and a power level of 88.3% is required
to obtain 31.5 knots instead of the designed 83.3%.
The total time for the transit each way is increased by .3 days
to account for bad weather, which is particularly prevalent on the North
Atlantic run. Also, three hours are allowed for port entry and exit time,
The total time at sea, 78.6%, is slightly less than the 80% that
Sea-Land reports for the rest of its fleet. However, this is to be ex-
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The major advantage of nuclear power is fuel cost. An under-
standing of fossil fuel and nuclear fuel costs and cost trends is essen-
tial to an economic comparison of the two propulsion systems.
The primary fuel oil burned in fossil fuel propulsion plants is
the residual oil, Bunker C. The refining process separates the crude
oil into various quality products, and the percentage of these products
(gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil, etc.) can be changed depending on the
demand and the revenues available from each product. Residual oil is
the viscous fluid remaining after higher valued products have been re-
moved from the crude oil. Refineries in the United States have reduced
the percentage of residual produced to 6% of each barrel of crude oil.
Other countries with different demands have different product percent-
ages. In general, European refineries produce a substantially higher
percentage of residuals than the United States.
Fuel cost and cost trends must be analyzed both in the United
States and foreign ports because the SL-7 will carry sufficient fuel
for a one-way voyage only, and therefore will refuel both in this
country and in Europe or the Far East. Furthermore, this country's
dependence on oil imports, particularly residual oil has become sig-
nificant and foreign prices affect the United States market.
Although the cost of residual oil is determined by many inter-
dependent factors and cannot be tied directly to the cost of crude oil,
it can be assumed that the general cost trends in crude oil will be
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paralleled by similar trends in residual oil.
Since 1965 the United States demand for energy has been in-
creasing by greater than 5%/year. Although the United States is the
world's largest producer, it is also the largest consumer of petroleum
and demand has been outpacing supply. This country imported about 23%
of its crude oil requirements in 1971, 13% coming from the Middle East.
Even if large quantities of oil from Alaska reach the consumer by 1975,
the United States import requirements will continue to increase. United
States shale oil offers the possibility for large scale production,
however, more research is required and the price of oil will probably
have to increase to the $4 to $5 range before shale oil becomes
economical 10 . The National Petroleum Council predicts that the United
States will depend on foreign sources for more than half of its oil by
1985.
Residual oil consumption in this country far exceeds demand.
On the East Coast, regulations permit the unlimited importation of
residual oil and about 95% of the residuals consumed in this region are
imported, making the East Coast sensitive to the overseas market 11 .
In a study conducted by M. W. Kellogg Company for the Environ-
mental Protection Agency on the availability of residual oil, these
conclusions were reached:
1. The total world production potential for residual oil, with
no sulfur content limit, is sufficient to meet U. S. demand
through 1973, but 1974 and 1975 show deficits.
2. The total world supply of residuals of 0-1% sulfur required
by the U. S. shows an increasing deficit which in 1975 will be
532,000 barrels per day.
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The Kellogg Company said, "It can be concluded with reasonable
certainty that the U. S. will experience a chronic residual shortage
beginning in 1971 if prompt action is not taken to increase the world
supply potential."
Short-term supply methods to increase production will be ade-
quate to meet U. S. demand for the next three or four years. However,
the best long-term solution would be to step up production capabilities
of Western Hemisphere refineries. To make this expansion easier, it
will be necessary to develop:
1. Long-term, stable supply sources for low-sulfur African
crudes.
2. Long-term price incentives.
3. Methods for disposition of light petroleum fractions, which
are essentially by-products in the Caribbean and South American
producing areas
The world consumed twice as much oil during 1970 as it did dur-
ing 1960. This country is consuming 10-20% more oil than it is replac-
ing through new supplies. 1959 was the last year that domestic explora-
tion was keeping pace with demand. To correct this will require in-
creased exploration. To spur increased exploration will require higher
prices. A $.25/bbl increase in early 1971 did not produce the desired
result for most oil men feel that the hike did not improve their
position of a year earlier due to increased taxes coupled with sharp
increases in material and labor costs. Fuel oil prices probably must
increase by $.50 to $1 per barrel to spur exploration 13 .
The Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association
(TIPRO) has called for a 5% annual increase in the wellhead price of
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crude oil. With this rate of increase the 1971 wellhead price of Texas
crude of $3.28/bbl would increase to $3.90/bbl in 1975, and $5.13/bbl in
1980. A $.60/bbl increase would be required to restore domestic well-
head prices to the 1959 parity
Dr. Richard Gonzalez, noted oil economist, suggests that if
prices in general continue to increase at 3-5% annually, crude price
increase should range from 5-7% a year if the required exploration is to
be accomplished
The foreign cost of crude oil is now increasing, and the era of
relatively low oil prices in Europe and the Far East has apparently
ended.
The steadily increasing world wide demand for petroleum has re-
sulted in a change from a buyers' to a sellers' market. Until 1971 the
oil companies had been able to keep prices down by dealing with each oil
exporting country separately. This changed in 1971 when the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) consisting of Iran, Venezuela,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Indonesia, Iraq, Algeria, Abu Dhabi, and
Qatar which produce 85% of the oil that moves in world trade, began
dealing with the oil companies on a united basis.
In February 1971, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
and Qatar concluded with the oil companies what is known as the Teheran
Agreement. The agreement called for an immediate $.35/bbl increase in
the posted price of crude oil at the terminal, with an additional flat
increase of $.05/bbl and a 2.5% increase in June 1971, and in January
1973, 1974, and 1975. In addition, the tax rate was increased to 55%.
Although posted prices are usually higher than market prices,
they are the base for calculating the amount on which taxes are levied.
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The market price will be proportional to the posted price. The direct
effect of the agreement on Europe's price was to raise cost 15% immedi-
ately and by 25% over the next five years 1 .
The same rate of increase can be expected in the Far East. In
Japan, two major oil firms announced increases of $.28/bbl after the
Teheran Agreement was reached.
Although this agreement was supposed to last until 1975, the
revaluation of world currencies in late 1971 resulted in renegotiations.
On January 20, 1972 an agreement supplemental to the Teheran Agreement
was reached between representatives of the OPEC and the oil companies.
The agreement boosted immediately the posted price of Persian Gulf crude
oil by 8.49%. With a 55% tax rate, the cost to the oil companies will
increase by 4.67%, most of which will be passed on to the customer. In
addition, a mechanism was established to account for future price adjust-
ments in monetary exchange rates.
The OPEC is also demanding participation with the oil companies.
Talks were held in February 1972 with the Saudi Arabian Minister, re-
sulting in Saudi Arabia obtaining a 20% participation which the Minister
stated would eventually increase to 51% then to 100% ownership by the
year 2000. In return the oil companies are to receive 20% of the book
value of their investment with no consideration of the oil reserves
„
Other countries are asking for a larger percentage than Saudi Arabia.
Following the Teheran Agreement, negotiations were concluded
with Libya and Nigeria in April 1971. The Libya agreement provided for
a new base posting of $3.07/bbl with four scheduled increases of $.05/bbl
plus 2.5% in March 1971 and in January 1973, 1974, and 1975. In addi-
tion, while the Suez Canal is closed, a freight premium of $.12/bbl
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plus a variable premium based on tanker freight rates was to be applied.
The resulting cost per barrel of crude at the terminal in Libya in mid-
1971 was $3,447 and in Nigeria $3,422. Assuming the Suez Canal is re-
opened by 1975, the price on January 1, 1975 for Libya should be
$3.597 16 .
In October, Libya decreed a 3.57% boost in the exchange rate of
the Libyan dinar which would apply to all oil company payments. Then
in December 1971, Libya nationalized all British Petroleum (BP) holdings,
Their delegate to the OPEC said that the takeover was a warning to other
Libyan operators to fall in line on additional payments or suffer the
same fate. Since then, however, BP has established a successful free
world boycott of Libyan oil, and the Libyan government has had diffi-
culty recruiting the technically trained personnel needed to operate
the facilities. As a result, Libya has moderated its terms. However,
this has not prevented the government from demanding an increase in the
posted price similar to, but larger than, the supplemental Teheran
Agreement to account for the effect of the revaluation of world
currencies.
The only hope of keeping prices from increasing at a high rate
is if the OPEC agreement falls apart because one or more of the member
nations decides to increase revenues by reducing prices and increasing
production. International agreements such as this have in the past,
not lasted. Whether this one will is speculative.
Certainly prices will continue to increase. For with the ex-
pectation of consumption doubling in the 70 's there is little hope that
Europe can reduce dependence on OPEC members in the next five to ten




Venezuela, in December 1970, increased the tax rate on oil com-
pany profits from 52% to 58%. In 1971 the government revalued the
bolivar upward by 2% and increased the posted price on crude oil by
$.26/bbl; this resulted in an average effective increase of Venezuelan
crude oil of $.32/bbl. In addition, rigid production quotas were estab-
lished which would result in an increased tax if the quotas were not met.
For residuals, the government increased the tax reference price
of the .3% sulfur fuel oil from $3.52/bbl to $4.35/bbl. With a 58% tax
the increase cost to the company is $.48/bbl. This price has more than
doubled from $1.91/bbl in early 1971 to $3.596/bbl 1 7 .
In addition, Venezuela has served notice of termination of its
trade agreement with the United States. Barring a new agreement or
legislation, the tariff on crude oil will be increased by over $.15/bbl,
thus increasing the cost to the customer.
Based on the above discussion, a price increase of 3% a year is
believed to be conservative and will be assumed for this study. Figure
7-1 shows the trend in the price of residual oil on the East Coast since
1950, along with the projected increase of 3% a year. With a 1971 cost
of $3.25/bbl the projected cost in 1978 is $3.88/bbl.
Fuel oil cost for 1978 based on the operating schedule pre-
sented in Chapter VI can be calculated as follows:
Cost/year = (Cost/bbl) (bbl/year)
bbl/year = (bbl/voyage) (voyages/year)
bbl/voyage = ^T C^F
i




t^ = Days at the specified power level
F = 6.62bbl/Long Ton
Using Figures 4-3 and 4-4 and the operating schedule in
Chapter VI, the amount of fuel consumed per voyage can be computed:




( 42LT/d)(3.0d) = 126
Total = 6162 LT
bbl/year = (6162LT) (26 voyages/year) (6. 62bbl/LT)
= 1,060,603
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To understand what affects the cost of nuclear fuel requires an
understanding of what the fuel is, and how it is produced.
The Core
Energy is generated in the core of a pressurized water reactor
when fissile atoms absorb a low energy neutron causing the atom to fis-
sion or split apart, on the average, into two different isotopes called
fission fragments, plus two or three neutrons. These fission fragments
have a high kinetic energy which is converted to heat when they collide
with the surrounding fuel and structural material. This is the primary
source of heat generated in the core.
The only naturally occurring fissile material suitable for use
in the core is an isotope of uranium, U-235, which comprises only .7%
of the uranium found in nature. Most of the remaining uranium is U-238
which can be converted to fissile isotopes of plutonium, Pu-239 and
Pu-241, by the absorption of neutrons. The breeder reactor is being
developed to produce these isotopes in quantities sufficient to meet
the increasing demand for fuel. However, they will not be the primary
source of fuel until the 1990' s.
To sustain the fissioning of the fuel requires that at least
one of the neutrons released during a previous fission cause the fission-
ing of another atom. If this interaction occurs on a continuing basis,
a chain reaction is taking place, and the reactor is said to be critical,
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To insure that a chain reaction occurs requires that sufficient fissile
material be available in the core to have a high enough probability that
one of the fission neutrons will be absorbed by the fuel and cause an-
other fission. Otherwise, these neutrons will be absorbed without
fissioning by the U-238, structural material, fission products, or
water in the core, or they will escape from the core. When U-235 is
the fissile material, its concentration is increased by the enrichment
of natural uranium to a U-235 content of 2 to 4%. Figure 8-1 area "A"
represents the amount of fuel required to achieve criticality in a new
core.
CRITICAL MASS





However, as fissioning continues, the fission fragments xenon
and samarium, which are very strong neutron absorbers and are known as
poisons, build up in the core. Thus additional fissile material must be
added above that required for a new core to account for the buildup of
these poisons. The total amount of fuel required to keep the reactor
critical at anytime during its life is known as the critical mass.
Figure 8-1 areas "A" + "P" represents the critical mass of the reactor.
In addition, for the core to operate for a period of time re-
quires an inventory of fuel to be available, otherwise as the fuel is
consumed, the amount of fissile material is reduced below the critical
mass and a chain reaction can no longer be sustained. This inventory of
fuel, Figure 8-1 area "E", is then the material from which the energy
is obtained over core life.
As mentioned above, the fissile isotopes Pu-239 and Pu-241 are
being produced as U-238 absorbs neutrons. These isotopes then add to
the fissile material inventory and life of the core. However, their
rate of production is less than the rate of consumption of the fissile
material. When the fuel represented by area "E", Figure 8-1 is consumed,
the reactor must be refueled. However, there still remains in the core
the critical mass consisting of U-235, Pu-239 and Pu-241 which can be
separated from the core and sold or recycled.
Fuel Cycle
Figure 8-2 presents the fuel cycle. The quantity of material
specified is that amount required at each stage of the manufacturing
process necessary to provide the 11,470 Kg of 3.7% enriched uranium re-
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Uranium, in the form of U-0R , is mined in the western part of
this country using conventional techniques. The average concentration
of the ore is three to five pounds of U~Og per ton. The concentration
is increased during the milling process to between 70% and 90%. This
material is known as yellowcake. The U is then refined to a high
3 o
purity and converted to a gas, UF,-, which is required for the enriching
process. During enrichment the percentage of U-235 is increased to the
desired level. This process produces a large quantity of depleted ura-
nium known as tails, which is stored for future use. The enriched UF/-
is then converted to the form used in the core, U0 9 . The UO2 is pel-
letized and loaded into zirconium fuel rods. These fuel rods are
grouped into fuel elements. These fuel elements are then combined to
form the core. Once the core has been expended, it will be replaced.
The old core, due to its high radioactivity and associated decay heat,
will be allowed to cool in a storage pool for a number of months prior
to shipment to the reprocessing plant. Reprocessing involves the sepa-
ration of the uranium and plutonium from the spent fuel using chemical
techniques. The resulting fuel is a nitrate form which is converted to
a fluoride and sold or recycled into a new core.
Cost analysis of nuclear fuel not only involves the direct cost
of the process as outlined above, but also the cost of money. This
process takes an average of twelve to sixteen months, and the purchaser
must make payments at various stages of the manufacturing process. The
procurement of fuel can be accomplished through one of several methods.
A fuel supplier can be contracted to handle the entire process and supply
a finished core, or the purchaser could contract individually for each
step of the process from the purchase of yellowcake to final core
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installation. The relative magnitude of the payments and a typical
time sequence of when those payments would be made is presented in
Figure 8-3. The "Z" designations in Figure 8-3 refer to the particular
process specified in Figure 8-2.
To obtain an average annual cost for the core during its opera-
ting life, the individual procurement payments during manufacture will
be brought, using the present worth technique equation (3-4), to the
start up date. ZQ in Figure 8-3 represents the present worth of all
procurement costs.
The ship will then operate from four to five years during which
time the inventory charges for owning the fuel and the fuel depreciation
must be considered as part of the fuel cost.
At the end of core life, the residual value of the core will be
obtained by computing the present worth, at the time the plant is shut
down, of all reprocessing costs and subtracting this from the value of
the recovered uranium and plutonium. The salvage value of the fuel is
represented by Z in Figure 8-3. The average annual cost with and with-
out taxes will then be computed using equations (3-11) and (3-12)
.
The characteristics of the core to be used in this study are
















































































Power (MWt Nuclear) 312.9
(MWt Nuclear + gamma + pump) 314.1
Initial Loading (Kg U) 11,470
Enrichment (Average) 3.7%
Burnup (MWD/MTU) (Average) 31,000
(Maximum) 45,000
Discharge Loading (Kg U) 10,950
Discharge Enrichment (Average) 1.3%




Effective Full Power Days 1,136
Cost Projections
Projections of nuclear fuel costs into the 1980' s and beyond
are at best educated approximations as are projections of fossil fuel
costs. However, projections are necessary for economic analysis of the
ship over its operational life. With an understanding of the fuel
cycle, nuclear fuel cost projections can now be analyzed by examining
each area of cost.
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Yellowcake - The Atomic Energy Commission reports that known United
States uranium reserves in 1971 that were available at less than $10 per
pound, were 390,000 tons with 246,000 tons of this ore available at less
than $8 per pound, and estimated additional reserves of 680,000 tons 1 .
With the cumulative demand by 1980 expected to be about 200,000 tons,
the known United States reserves are sufficient to last into the 1980'
s
and the estimated reserves well into the 1990' s. When breeder reactor
development is considered, the actual demand for uranium peaks in the
1990' s as plutonium becomes available in significant quantities. This
peak will occur earlier if the plutonium now being produced in light
water reactors is recycled. By 1980, the annual plutonium production
is estimated to be 25,000 Kg 17 . In addition, the United States Govern-
ment stockpile of 50,000 tons and the option to import uranium if re-
quired, insure the availability of this fuel well into the next
century.
As a result of the present over supply of uranium, the yellow-
cake price is somewhat depressed, and is expected to remain so through
the middle of the 1970' s, after which time it will follow the cost of
production. The 1976 cost of yellowcake is estimated to be $7 per
pound.
The cost of production can be broken down into labor cost,
material cost, and fixed cost. Table 8-2 shows this breakdown along
with the escalation rate based on a labor escalation rate of 6% per




BREAKDOWN OF FUEL CYCLE COST
Item Labor Material Fixed Escalation Cost
% % % %/Yr 1976
Mining, Milling 40-45 40-45 10-20 3.6 7.00
Refining l^Og
Conversion 30 60 10 3.9 3.00
U3°8 to UF 6
Enrichment 15 50 35 3,4 34.00
Fabrication 60 30 10 -2.0
(to 1982)
78.40
Reprocessing 15 18 67 -1.0 31.00
Shipping 40 30 30 3.3 6.00
Conversion - The conversion of U«0R to UF, is performed in commercial
plants using a chemical process. Its cost is expected to increase along
with the general cost trend. The cost in 1976 is estimated to be $3.00
per Kg U.
Enrichment - Presently the Federal Government is the only supplier of
enriched uranium. However, the Atomic Energy Commission has recently
initiated procedures to make available to certain manufacturers tech-
nical information on the enrichment process so that they could evaluate
the feasibility of establishing commercial enrichment facilities.
Enrichment costs are established by the government based on
the estimated cost of production over a given time frame. The price
for enrichment is then set at a flat rate over this time period. The

61.
rate established in 1971 of $32 per separative work unit per Kg U is
supposed to exist through the middle of the 1970' s. However, to be
conservative, the 1976 price is assumed to be $34 and to escalate from
that point based on the breakdown of cost as shown in Table 8-2.
Fabrication - The cost of fabrication is subject to the normal escala-
tion with a cost breakdown as shown in Table 8-2. However, the cost of
fabrication is also subject to cost reductions due to volume, automation
and learning curve type of improvements. Projections by Westinghouse
Electric Corporation show an average annual reduction in cost of about
2.6% per year through 1985 l . The Atomic Energy Commission shows a
reduction of about 3%/year through 198020 . Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory developed a detailed computer program known as FUELCO to provide
estimates of fuel cost as a function of time. These projections show a
1% to 2% decrease in the cost of fabrication through the year 2000
The cost of fabrication for a large utility in 1972 was averag-
ing from $70 to $85 per KgU. With a three ship purchase, the cost of
fabrication is assumed equal to that of a utility company, and the $85
per Kg U cost is assumed for 1972. Figure 8-4 plots the projected cost
using the three estimates discussed above. To be conservative, a 2%
reduction in the cost of fabrication will be assumed through 1982,
thereafter the price is assumed to remain constant. The 1976 cost is































Trend in Fabrication Cost
FIGURE 8-4
Reprocessing - The recover of fuel from the spent core is also volume
dependent. The rapid growth in nuclear power plants indicate the need
for large reprocessing facilities. There are several high capacity
plants either planned or under construction. Therefore, the cost of
reprocessing is expected to decrease through the 1990' s. Estimates of
cost reduction average from 1.5% to 2% per year. A 1% reduction is as-
sumed for this study.
Shipping - The cost of shipping is related directly to the breakdown
given in Table 8-2.
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Uranium - The value of the reprocessed uranium is equal to the value of
an equivalent amount of uranium enriched to the discharge enrichment at
the time of reprocessing, less the reprocessing cost. Thus the value of
the discharged uranium is affected by the current price of U3O0 and the
current cost of conversion and enrichment.
Plutonium - The value of the discharged plutonium can be determined by
its value as a competitive alternative fuel to enriched uranium or as a
fuel for breeder reactors. However, substantial quantities of plutonium
for breeder reactors will not be required until the late 1980' s at which
time its value has been estimated to be between two and three times as
valuable as when it is recycled. To retain this plutonium until the
demand arose is not practical because of the storage and inventory cost.
An alternative would then be to recycle the plutonium from the first two
cores, then to sell the plutonium as a breeder fuel when the remaining
cores are reprocessed after 1991.
The value of the recycled plutonium is obtained by determining
what amount of equivalent uranium it represents and deducting any addi-
tional costs. As indicated above, reprocessing is a volume dependent
operation. With the relatively small cores of the SL-7N, the value of
the plutonium is reduced substantially because of this increased cost.
To alleviate this situation, the plutonium could be sold to a utility,
which has a high volume throughput, at a higher price than its value to
the SL-7N when recycled.
The value when recycled for the SL-7N is obtained as follows:
It is assumed that the plutonium will be blended with the tails re-
maining from the enrichment process.
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EP = Enrichment of discharged plutonium
AP = Amount of discharged plutonium
ET = Enrichment of tails
AT = Amount of tails
DE = Desired enrichment
AT + AP = Amount of fuel at the desired enrichment
(EP) (AP) + (ET) (AT) = DE(AT + AP)
For the SL-7N this would then be:
76 + (.0025) AT = (.037) (AT + 101)
AT = 1995 Kg
AT + AP = 2096 Kg
However, because the nuclear properties of plutonium are some-
what lower than uranium for use in light water reactors, the equivalent
amount of enriched uranium equal to 2096 Kg of plutonium fuel is only
.9(2096) or 1886 Kg. The value of this enriched fuel will then be ob-
tained by using the current price of uranium and the current cost of
conversion and enrichment at the time of reprocessing.
In addition to the reduction in value due to its nuclear
properties, plutonium is also more expensive to fabricate due to its
toxicity and the requirement for stricter controls and remote handling.
This increased fabrication cost must be subtracted from the value of
the recycled plutonium. This increase in cost has been estimated to
range from between 15% and 60% by the government and industry. By 1982,
the time that the first core will be reprocessed, plutonium recycle
facilities will be firmly established and the increase in price will
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have been substantially reduced. A conservative estimate of a 25% in-
crease in the cost for fabricating plutonium is assumed.
Using the above assumptions, the value of recycled plutonium at
1972 prices for the SL-7N would be $4.11 per gram.
There have been several purchases of plutonium in 1972 at $7 per
gram. This increase in the value of plutonium over that for the SL-7N
reflects the effects of volume throughput.
For this study a conservative middle of the road approach will
be used. It will not be assumed that the plutonium can be sold at a
higher value as a breeder fuel, neither will it be assumed that the
plutonium will be recycled for use in the SL-7N at its low value. In-
stead it is assumed that the plutonium will be sold at 1972 prices to
a utility for recycle at $6 per gram, $1 per gram less than its known
value in 1972. This value will increase with time as the value of ura-
nium as discussed above.
With the economic data from Table 3-1, the core data from
Table 8-1, and the cost of each fuel processing step with its associ-
ated escalation from Table 8-2, the core cost can be computed. Based
on the operating schedule presented in Chapter VI, the core will oper-
ate for 4.32 years. Table 8-3 shows the results of a computer cost
analysis using the program presented in Appendix B for the first core
of the SL-7N.
Refueling
Appendix C shows a 28-day refueling schedule which assumes
worker familiarity with the equipment and procedures. No major break-
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account for inevitable delays. This schedule should be achievable by
the fourth refueling. With three ships then, the second and subsequent
refuelings on each ship are assumed to follow this schedule. Although
shorter schedules have been proposed in similar studies, and several
utility company refuelings have been accomplished in a shorter time
period, the twenty-eight day schedule is believed to be realistic and
will be used in this study. The first refueling for each ship is as-
sumed to take 1-1/2 times as long, or forty-two days to allow the work-
ers time to become familiar with the equipment and procedures, and to
correct any errors in procedure. This time span is in agreement with
the time required for the partial refueling and the defueling of the
N.S. SAVANNAH.
Refueling Cost
The cost of refueling will be broken down as follows:
Refueling Facility - The cost of those facilities at the shipyard as-
signed to refueling such as the transfer cask, storage pool, radiologi-
cal control equipment, etc. Refueling facility cost will be based on
the 1967 cost of the Galveston facility of $800 per day 8 . The esti-
mated cost in 1978 is $1,108 per day and in 1982, $1,246 per day.
Refueling Labor - The refueling crew will consist of three shifts per
day and will work seven days per week. Each shift crew will be com-
posed of approximately nineteen men. It is estimated that the entire
crew will be required two-thirds of the time or twenty-eight days for
the first refueling. For the remaining fourteen days, nine men per
shift will be required. Based on an average hourly cost for shipyard
workers in 1971 of $10 per hour, the 1978 and 1982 costs are
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respectively $15 and $18.98 per hour.
Ship Force - Seventeen members of the ship's engineering department will
be required to operate the plant and to witness shipyard work. In addi-
tion, four members of the deck crew will be required for ship security.
Based on the 1971 average cost per day of $70 per man, the cost per man
in 1978 would be $105.25 per day and in 1982, $132.88 per day.
Miscellaneous Expenses - Those expenses not covered under the other
categories. Included here is the cost of protective clothing laundering
services, film badge service, expendable materials, and waste disposal.
The 1967 cost for a sixty-man force for twenty-eight days was $17,310.
The 1978 daily cost would be $713.14 and the 1982 cost, $802.64.
All refueling costs are escalated at a rate of 6% per year for
labor and 3% per year for material.
For this study refueling costs are considered an operating ex-
pense for the year of refueling. Other studies have included this cost
as part of the nuclear fuel cost and averaged it over the life of the
core. This is not the practice of utilities and will not be used here.
Table 8-4 presents a summary of the refueling cost for the first













Revenues derived from carrying cargo depends on the cargo
utilization, that is the quantity carried, and the freight rate.
The cargo utilization factor is the fraction of the ship's
available cargo carrying capacity that is filled with revenue producing
cargo. For the North Atlantic trade this factor is over 90%. The
cargo carrying capacity of the SL-7 and SL-7N as noted in Chapter IV
consisted of 1,096 containers plus general cargo in holds 1 and 2.
The freight rates depend on many variables which include the
particular trade route, the value of the cargo, the type of cargo, the
weight and volume of the cargo, and the amount of competition on the
trade route. In 1972, the cost of shipping a container from New York
to Rotterdam or Bremerhaven was anywhere from $800 to $2,200. An aver-
age cost of $1,200 per container will be used in this study with a 3%
escalation.
It will be assumed that the total revenue per crossing in 1972
will be equal to
(2) ($1200) (1096) = $2,630,400
This assumes that the cargo utilization will be less than 100%
by the amount of cargo space available in holds 1 and 2. The total




Now that the criteria and basic assumptions have been formulated,
an economic analysis can be performed. To aid in this analysis, a com-
puter program has been written and is presented in Appendix B.
The analysis will be accomplished by assuming an expected trend
in expenses over the ship's life, and then performing a sensitivity
analysis about the basic program with some of the more important para-
meters. The basic criteria used in this comparison will be the average
annual cost (AAC) . The assumptions for the basic program are those
presented in Tables 3-1, 5-1, 5-3, 5-4, 6-3, 6-4, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4 and
Chapter IX. The assumptions are believed to be conservative and in
general to favor the fossil fueled ship. That is, for example, the cost
of fossil fuel is expected to increase at a faster rate than the 3% as-
sumed for the basic program, and the cost of nuclear fuel is expected to
escalate at a somewhat slower rate than assumed.
In addition, the average annual net profit (AANP) will be exam-
ined. Although this requires additional assumptions, which tend to
make the comparison somewhat more speculative, it is necessary to ex-
amine what effect the loss of revenue, during the refuelings of the
SL-7N, has on the net profit of the ship.
Basic Program
The results of the comparison of the average annual cost (AAC)
and the average annual net profit (AANP) using the data presented in
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the previous chapters along with their assumed rate of escalation is
presented below:
Average Annual Cost SL-7 = 28,861,455
Average Annual Cost SL-7N = 28,731,920
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7 = 30,845,480
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7N = 30,759,100
The average annual cost of the SL-7N is shown to be slightly
less than that for the SL-7. However, the average annual net profit of
the SL-7 is slightly larger due to the loss of revenue during the four
refuelings of the SL-7N.
Based on the validity of the assumptions, it is concluded that
the two ships are competitive and that the difference in the results is
too small for use as a means of selecting either alternative. Further
analysis is thus required.
Zero Escalation
The results of a comparison in which it was assumed that there
was no escalation of costs or revenue over the ship's life are as
follows:
Average Annual Cost SL-7 = 23,211,945
Average Annual Cost SL-7N = 23,986,650
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7 - 23,572,190
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7N = 23,261,100
The advantage held by the SL-7N of a lower average annual cost
of about $130,000 using the basic program has now shifted to a $770,000
disadvantage. The reason being that in the basic program, fossil fuel
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cost escalated at a faster rate than nuclear fuel cost, whereas the
escalation is now assumed to be zero. The major economic advantage of
the nuclear powered ship has thus been eliminated.
The average annual net profit has also grown in favor of the
SL-7, however at not as fast a rate as the average annual cost. This is
because the effect of lost revenue during refueling has been reduced
with zero escalation in revenue.
The conclusion based on the assumption of zero escalation
would then be that the SL-7 is more economical, although by only 3.23%
of the average annual cost and 1.3% of the average annual net profit.
The assumption of zero escalation is obviously invalid, however, the
results do provide a benchmark for future comparison.
Varying the Debt to Total Capital Ratio
The assumed debt to total capital ratio, b, of .75 will now be
varied from 0.0 to 1.0.
Figure 10-1 shows that the average annual cost of the SL-7N
decreases below that of the SL-7 at debt to capital ratios above about
.74. This was to be expected due to the higher capital cost of the
SL-7N. As the debt to capital ratio increases, the effective cost of
money, given by equations (3-9) , decreases due to the tax credits on
interest payments that are tax deductible. In addition, the debt in-
terest rate assumed was lower than the equity return rate, therefore,
at higher debt to capital ratios the lower interest rate reduces the ef-
fective cost of money. It thus appears that choosing a high debt to
capital ratio favors the nuclear ship. However, this is not necessarily
true. Looking at the effect on the average annual net profit, the
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opposite result is obtained. That is, as b decreases, the average an-
nual net profit of the SL-7N increases above that of the SL-7 at b less
than about . 1. It must be remembered that the average annual net profit
and the average annual cost are not only looking at the direct cost, but
also the time value of money. The present value of receiving $1 a year
from now at an effective cost of money of 4% is $.96, whereas its
present value at an effective cost of money of 8% is only $.92. Thus,
the higher the effective cost of money, the lower will be the value to-
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This effect is clearly seen with the average annual net profit.
Here not only the effect of cost is being examined, but also the effect
of revenue. As b decreases, the effective cost of money increases,
thus the present value of the loss of revenue due to refueling in the
fifth, ninth, fourteenth, and eighteenth years of operation is reduced.
At a debt to total capital ratio of .1, the reduction in the effect of
the lost revenue during refueling overrides the increase in cost due to
higher interest payments and the average annual net profit of the SL-7N
becomes larger than that of the SL-7. Of course, with a choice of dif-
ferent parameters, this crossover may not occur or occur at a higher b.
The above discussion demonstrates the necessity of examing
different criteria prior to making a decision for the results that
might intuitively be expected may not occur. This is demonstrated again
in the following analysis.
Varying the Escalation Rate of Revenue
Revenue was assumed to escalate at 3% per year. The effect of
escalation rates of 1% to 6% is presented in Figure 10-2.
As the rate of escalation decreases, the average annual net
profit of the SL-7 decreases below that of the SL-7N. This occurs
because the value of the lost revenue during refueling decreases with a
decreasing rate of escalation. Therefore, the effect of the lost revenue
decreases and the difference between the average annual net profit of
the SL-7 and SL-7N decreases until about a rate of escalation of 1.4%
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FIGURE 10-2
This analysis points out the importance of minimizing the loss
of revenue. It must be remembered that the SL-7 was assumed to have
only a one week outage every five years. If, in fact, an outage time
of two or three weeks is more likely, then the effect of lost revenue
during refueling will be reduced and the point at which the SL-7N be-
comes more profitable will occur at a higher escalation rate.
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Varying the Bank Interest Rate
The assumed interest rate of 9% will be varied from 6% to 14%.
Figure 10-3 shows that higher interest rates are more detrimental to the
SL-7N because of the higher capital cost of the ship and the capital
nature of nuclear fuel.
At interest rates below about 9.6%, the average annual cost of
the SL-7N is below that of the SL-7 and at interest rates below 7.6% the














Varying the Amortization Period
The amortization period of twenty years assumed for the basic
program will be varied from twelve to twenty years.
AANP SL-7
o
12 14 16 18 20
Time of Ship Amortization (years)
Variation of the
Time of Ship Amortization
FIGURE 10-4
Figure 10-4 shows that as the amortization period is extended
beyond seventeen years, the average annual cost of the SL-7N decreases
below that of the SL-7. However, as with Figure 10-1, what might have
intuitively been expected to happen with the average annual net profit,
is different from the results. Here again, the time value of money
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shows its effect. For as the amortization period decreases, the time
at which the annual net profit of the SL-7N increases above that of the
SL-7 is reduced, thus the sum of the present value of the annual net
profit and the average annual net profit of the SL-7N increases at a
faster rate than that for the SL-7. Although this rate of increase is
not great enough to overcome the higher amortization payments of the
SL-7N, thus the SL-7 retains the higher average annual net profit.
Varying the Time for Construction of the SL-7N
It was assumed that the total time for construction of the SL-7N
would be 4.5 years, based on the vendor estimate of fifty months for
completion of the nuclear steam supply system. This time could be ex-
tended due to construction delays or licensing problems as being en-
countered by utilities. Therefore, the effect of lengthening the
construction time to 5.5 or 6.5 years will be examined.
Figure 10-5 shows that as the construction time for the SL-7N
is increased, the average annual cost increases, and at about 6.4 years
equals that of the SL-7. The average annual net profit of the SL-7N
decreases with increasing construction time, the difference between
the SL-7 and SL-7N increasing. However, the average annual cost and
the average annual net profit are not as sensitive to variation in























Varying the Escalation Rate of Bunker C
Fuel oil was conservatively estimated to increase at 3% per
year based on known contracts that exist with Middle East countries
and the requirement to increase exploration to meet demands at home.
The actual rate of escalation could be higher than the assumed rate if
the oil companies decide to pass along all of the increases in cost that
result from the Middle East agreements, or if the OPEC countries gain
the participation they desire and force up the price of crude oil.

81.
Figure 10-6 shows that at an escalation rate above 2.8% the
average annual cost of the SL-7 becomes greater than that of the SL-7N.
However, the rate of escalation must be larger than 3.5% before the av-
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Varying the Escalation Rate of the Cost of Uranium
The effect of escalation on the cost of yellowcake different
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Figure 10-7 shows that a variation in the escalation rate for
yellowcake has a relatively minor influence on the average annual cost
and the average annual net profit. Because the cost of yellowcake is
one of the three major expenses in the cost of nuclear fuel, the other
two being the cost of enrichment and the cost of fabrication, it can be
asserted that a variation of one or two percent of any particular fuel
cycle cost will not significantly effect the final decision in the
selection of a power plant. However, a variation of all fuel cycle
cost parameters would of course be significant. A large number of com-
binations in the variations of the fuel cycle cost parameters is thus
possible.
Increase in the Number of Containers Carried by the SL-7N
As discussed in Chapter IV, the SL-7N may be capable of carry-
ing ten to twenty more containers than the SL-7 , due to the elimination
of a portion of the aft house and uptakes and the reduction in the fuel
oil plus lightship displacement.
Figure 10-8 shows that by increasing the number of containers
carried by three, the average annual revenue of the SL-7N increases
above that of the SL-7 overcoming the effect of lost revenue during
refueling. The average annual cost of the SL-7N increases due to the
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Varying the Construction Cost of the SL-7N
If the difference in the construction cost of the two ships
were to increase, the probable cause would be an increase in the cost
of the nuclear steam supply system. As shown in Figure 10-9, with the
vendor estimated cost for the NSSS of $16,000,000 the SL-7N is com-
petitive, however, with cost in excess of $17,000,000 the SL-7 becomes
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Selection of alternative power plants depends on many factors
which if combined in the proper manner, can be made to favor either
side. For example, by assuming an interest rate of 7.5%, an escalation
rate of fossil fuel of 5%, and the SL-7N carrying the additional twenty
containers, the results are clearly favorable for the SL-7N as shown
below:
Average Annual Cost SL-7 = 29,672,748
Average Annual Cost SL-7N = 28,163,900
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7 = 31,455,280
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7N = 31,875,710
Careful selection of criteria is thus of primary importance in
the selection of alternative power plants.
As stated in Chapter I, the objective of this study is to com-
pare the economics of a nuclear powered and a fossil fueled container-
ship in a manner that has a minimum of assumptions. So far, this study
has assumed no government support of any kind other than third party
nuclear liability. However, the comparison would be incomplete without
observing the effect of a construction differential subsidy. As dis-
cussed in Appendix A, the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 reduces the con-
struction differential subsidy from the previously available 55% to 35%
in 1976. Although this subsidy would not be available to unsubsidized
operators such as Sea-Land Service, it would be available to the numerous
subsidized operators such as American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, and
therefore must be considered.
Applying a 35% construction differential subsidy to the basic
program for both ships results in the following:
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Average Annual Cost SL-7 = 25,955,419
Average Annual Cost SL-7N = 24,932,060
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7 = 31,562,800
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7N = 31,696,540
The SL-7N would then be the clear choice with an average annual
cost of $1,023,000 less than the SL-7 and an average annual net profit
larger by $134,000.
Furthermore, applying the subsidy in the case of zero escalation
of cost and revenue:
Average Annual Cost SL-7 = 20,305,908
Average Annual Cost SL-7N = 20,186,700
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7 = 24,289,500
Average Annual Net Profit SL-7N = 24,198,540
Thus with the subsidy the SL-7N is competitive in the case of




The judgment of risk versus potential return on investment for
any prospective ship operator cannot be established solely by an objec-
tive economic analysis. There are many factors upon which it is diffi-
cult to place an economic value. The choice between a nuclear and
fossil fueled SL-7 for an unsubsidized operator is not obvious for the
alternative power plants are competitive and an economic evaluation can
be shifted in favor of either power plant by only a small shift in para-
meters. There is no clear alternative. The most important factors in
making a decision are the difference in capital cost of the ships and
the rate at which fossil fuel prices escalate. The difference in the
cost of construction is approximately equal to the cost of the nuclear
steam supply system. The effect of this cost difference can be sub-
stantially reduced and the selection thrown in favor of the nuclear
powered ship if a construction differential subsidy is used. In addi-
tion, if legislation such as HR8201 introduced into Congress in 1971,
which provides for assistance in the development, construction, and
operation of nuclear powered merchant ships as discussed in Appendix A,
becomes law, a nuclear powered merchant ship would have an economic
advantage.
Political instability and nationalistic trends evident in many
of the world's major petroleum producing countries must give cause for
serious concern. The price of residual oil has increased sharply since
1968 and will continue to increase. The only question is at what rate.
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The higher the rate of escalation, the more favorable the nuclear
powered ship becomes.
Other factors upon which an economic value cannot readily be as-
signed or which are difficult to anticipate, as to when they will occur
and to what extent, must also be considered.
Environmental pollution considerations are such problems. The
SL-7 has been designed to eliminate one of these problems, that is, oil
pollution of the sea. As discussed in Chapter IV, the ship has separate
ballast and fuel oil tanks to prevent contaminating the harbors when she
deballasts to take on fuel oil. Its effect is to limit the flexi-
bility of the ship for she must take on bunkers at each end of her run.
Furthermore, she cannot operate at design speed on long trade routes
such as Trade Route 12, East Coast of the United States to the Far East.
The economic effect of these restrictions can only be established by the
company making the decision. Obviously, if they intend to operate on
long trade routes, or anticipate problems in refueling at both ends of
the run, or there is a possibility of being tied up in port for a long
duration due to strikes that prevent refueling, then the nuclear power
plant would be favored.
Another environmental problem that has not yet affected ship-
owners is that of air pollution. For example, the ships entering and
leaving New York harbor each day are contributing to the air pollution
problems of that area. Ships are not now required to burn the more ex-
pensive low sulphur fuel nor to install pollution control equipment.
It can be expected that low sulphur fuel will be required at a minimum
when entering port, and that installation of pollution control equip-
ment at least on new construction ships will be required in the future.
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Both of these control measures will increase the cost of the fossil
fueled ship, and the possibility of a reduction in cargo capacity due
to pollution control equipment would make the nuclear powered ship
more attractive.
Additional factors that can be considered for the SL-7 are
loading and stability problems. The SL-7 must be programmed as to the
distribution of containers, fuel oil, and ballast, and ballast must be
taken on while underway as fuel oil is consumed in order to assure
adequate stability. Also at present the fueling facilities at most
ports are inadequate to fuel the SL-7 at the rate she is designed to
accept. As a result, fuel loading time can be greater than cargo
handling time and the ship's inport time will be dependent on the
fueling facilities available.
Reduction in cost due to a reduction in topside maintenance
and damage to deck cargo caused by corrosive stack gases, which are
eliminated by the nuclear power plant, must also be considered.
The effect of the revenue earned each year and the rate of es-
calation must be thoroughly examined. As seen in Chapter X the average
annual cost of the SL-7N is lower than that of the SL-7. However, at
the yearly revenue and rate of escalation of revenue selected, the
average annual net profit is slightly higher for the SL-7. If the
yearly revenue were lower, or the rate of escalation were lower, the
SL-7N becomes more profitable in comparison to the SL-7. Thus on other
trade routes where the yearly revenue might be less, or if competition
increases forcing revenue down, the SL-7N might be more economical.
It must be remembered that this comparison is being made on a
ship designed for a fossil fuel power plant and this favors the fossil
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fueled ship. For equal transport capacity the nuclear ship would have a
smaller displacement, thus less draft, reducing the power requirements.
The capital cost of the ship would therefore be less along with a lower
annual fuel cost and a longer core life, making the nuclear powered
vessel more economical.
Then there are problems faced by the nuclear powered ship which
could adversely affect its position. Third party nuclear liability is
of particular concern. If the government does not provide liability
protection for marine power plants as is provided for utilities under
the Price-Anderson Act, a nuclear merchant marine would be greatly
handicapped.
Another potential area of difficulty is with the maritime
unions. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines solved this problem while
operating the N.S. SAVANNAH by establishing a subsidary company and
working out separate contracts with the unions. Crew problems can be
expected to occur, however if they are approached in a thoughtful manner
and problem areas are anticipated, the problems should be able to be re-
solved as demonstrated by AEIL's experience.
Port entry difficulty could occur in some ports. Although this
would not be expected in Europe if prior arrangements are made because
the N.S. OTTO HAHN has operated in the area since 1968. In the Far
East, Japan was a problem for the N.S. SAVANNAH, however, since that
time Japan has constructed the N.S. MUTSU and port entry should not be
as great a problem.
Pollution problems might occur in the future. The nuclear power-
ed ship will be designed to discharge contaminated water into retention
tanks while in port. These tanks would then be processed in the same
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manner as shore based power plants and discharged at sea. Or the ship-
owner may be required to establish discharge collection facilities at
the ship's home port or facilities aboard the ship for recycling the
water back into the primary system.
From the foregoing discussion, it is concluded that the selec-
tion of either power plant for the SL-7 for use on the North Atlantic
run is competitive. However, if an operator desired to build a new
ship with the transport capacity of the SL-7 that would be designed
specifically for the power plant chosen, then the nuclear power plant
would have an economic advantage, and this would be encouraged if a
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From the launching of the VIRGINIA, the first ship to be built in
the new world, American ships have shown novelty in design and independ-
ence in method. After the Revolutionary War, trade with England was
discouraged, so our ships spread throughout the rest of the world and
our young nation joined the ranks of the leading maritime nations of
the world.
There were many attempts in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries to apply the steam engine to ships. However, the era
of commercial navigation did not begin until the launching of Robert
Fulton's CLERMONT in 1807. She was a paddle wheel ship powered by a
steam engine developed by James Watt. By 1819 there were 100 steam
vessels on America's inland waters. In 1808 John Stevens became the
first owner and operator of a sea-going steam ship when he sent the
PHOENIX from New York to Philadelphia. In 1810 Stevens succeeded in
running a steam launch equipped with twin screws revolving against
each other. He also designed the first water tube boiler and used a
steam pressure of 50 psi as compared to 10 psi used by Fulton. However,
lack of machine tools and foundaries hindered the advancement of his
ideas from experimental work to full scale commercial use. John Stevens'
developments were fifty years ahead of his profession and his country.
America was only mildly interested in steam propulsion for she was on
her way to the perfection of sail 1 .
Another American innovation in the early nineteenth century
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occurred when a group of New York merchants established the first
freight and passenger service based on a definite schedule. They adver-
tised precise sailing hours, with direct and reasonably rapid voyages
to Liverpool and Havre. Ships were designed and built for this type of
trade. The Black-Ball line was the first and most celebrated of this
type of service.
For many years ships of Europe and America had been engaged in
the tea trade with China. Speed was particularly desirable in this
trade because of the long distances from New England around the Cape of
Good Hope to China, and because it was believed that tea lost some of
its flavor with time. A quicker turn-around meant higher profits. This
lead to the development of the clipper ships. The first being the RAIN-
BOW, launched in New York in 1845. In this area, the clippers captured
the trade from the British. From records of the time, it is revealed
that the clippers would enter Canton, unload the cargo and take on a
full load of tea and sail immediately for New England or London, even
though they charged 2.5 times as much as the British ships which for
months had been waiting for a full load. The clippers made the passage
in three months instead of six that the British required 1 . Development
was also spurred on by the California Gold Rush with the need to trans-
port many men and supplies quickly to California. However, these ships
were expensive to run. They could not survive on low freight rates,
and the end of the gold rush was the beginning of the end of the
clipper ship.
During this time of expanding sail America continued to pioneer
in the area of steam propulsion, but failed to follow through on her
developments. In 1819 the SAVANNAH, with a steam engine as an auxiliary,
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made the first transatlantic passage, using her engine eighty hours out
of the twenty-nine day voyage from Savannah, Georgia to Liverpool. In
1834 the propeller-driven auxiliary steamer MIDAS sailed from New York
to China. Other than these few pioneering efforts, it was left to the
British to develop and refine steam propulsion. In 1838 the SIRUS made
the first transatlantic crossing completely under steam. In 1840 with
the inaugural voyage of the steamer BRITANNIA, began the first regular
steamer service between Europe and North America . The British pushed
the development of screw propulsion and iron ships, though on long
voyages as to Australia and India, sailing ships continued to dominate
because of the inefficiency of steam propulsion. However, with the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the end of the sailing ship era was
in sight.
Thus the nineteenth century that had begun so well for maritime
America closed with our country occupying a very low position in the
maritime world. Whereas 90% of our foreign commerce was carried in
American bottoms at the beginning of the century, only 10% was being
carried as we entered the twentieth century. Steam propulsion ashore,
that is, our railroads, were developed and pushed forth across the
country because the government offered them land grants, a form of
subsidy. The government, however, lacked the foresight to foster and
develop steam propulsion at sea .
With no merchant marine to speak of, we moved into the twentieth
century. We had only six ships in regular service to Europe, five to
South America, and five to the Orient. Then World War I began. Those
foreign ships that provided our trade were engaged at home, our exports
began piling up in warehouses and imports dwindled. People complained
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and the few ships we had became very valuable. Shipyards finally start-
ed to work, 160 new yards were built, 3,270 ships were ordered and 2,300
completed by the end of the war. This construction moved us from fifth
to second place in the number of ships and total tonnage. In addition
to civilian requirements World War I was a convincing demonstration of
the necessity of maintaining an American Merchant Marine even at public
expense, for after the United States entered the war, the Navy, as it
has in every other conflict, wanted and needed numerous vessels as aux-
iliaries and transports. Most of our troops were carried to Europe and
back in allied ships 7 .
After the war, we quickly forgot the lesson we had so difficultly
been taught and our merchant marine again began to decline. Not one new
keel was laid for foreign commerce between 1922 and 1928. Then Congress
took action and for awhile it appeared that we had learned a lesson. The
Merchant Marine Act of 1928 resulted. It offered construction loans at
advantageous rates and operating subsidies. Under this stimulus, forty-
two vessels were built between 1929 and 1932. Then government support
was cut, the depression had its effect, and by 1934 only five ships were
under construction 1 . Public hearings were held by Congress and the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 resulted. By November 1938, sixty modern
ships were under construction. These ships allowed the United States
to enter World War II better prepared than we entered World War I, and
along with the tremendous ship building program during the war, to save
Europe. By the end of the war, the American fleet contained 3,696 ships,
the largest in the world. It was realized during the war that block
obsolescence of these ships would occur in the 50' s and 60' s, however
nothing was done to prevent this from happening 15 . Our government
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again ignored the lessons of history and allowed the merchant marine to
decline despite its demonstrated importance to our economic welfare and
national security.
By 1950 our merchant fleet was only carrying about 12% of our
total and 32% of our general foreign trade. The Korean War required the
reactivation of some ships of the reserve fleet, but few new ships were
built, and after the war most of the reserve ships were retired. It was
finally recognized in 1958 when our fleet was carrying only 8% of our
total and 25% of our general foreign trade, that the obsolescence of
war-built tonnage necessitated a rebuilding program. The Eisenhower
Administration then committed itself to a replacement program, envision-
ing the construction of 300 modern ships over a ten-year period to re-
place the subsidized liner fleet. However, the commitment did not last,
and the program began fading. The best effort of the program occurred
in 1963 when twenty-seven ship contracts were executed, and this then
was reduced to ten or eleven ships per year, instead of the thirty
proposed. Between 1958 and 1967, the United States flag fleet share of
the commercial general cargo trade declined from 25% to 8%, even though
there was an increase of from 33 to 37.5 million tons of general cargo.
Again in 1965 we found ourselves in need of a fleet to support
the buildup of military forces in Vietnam. This required the reactiva-
tion of our obsolete reserve fleet. Our operating merchant fleet did
not have the capacity required to transport the war materials and men
required for 95% of the supplies, and initially 66% of the troops were
moved by ship .
A new threat is also posing on our doorstep. When between 1958
and 1968 our merchant marine expanded by only 1.7 million deadweight
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tons and the average age of our ships increased from fourteen to twenty-
seven years, the Soviet Union constructed eight million deadweight tons.
In 1966 the U.S. had only 1,167 merchant ships, the Soviet Union 1,343 3 .
Today our fleet numbers 650 ships in foreign trade, about 400 of which
will reach the end of their economic life within the next few years
The total foreign trade carried by the U.S. is down to about 5%. By
1980 our fleet will have declined to 310 ships if our shipbuilding
program is not expanded.
Competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is all
encompassing. It is political, military, and economic. We have recog-
nized their political and military challenge, but have not awaken to
their economic challenge, particularly at sea. Today the Soviet fleet
outnumbers ours, even including the activated reserve fleet. The Soviet
Union is not merely breaking loose from its traditional continental em-
phasis on containment, it is aggressively moving to dominate the sea
lanes of the world. For by gaining world shipping dominance, it could
obtain economically what it has failed to obtain politically and mili-
tarily, since it could possibly deny the strategic materials the United
States must import 3 .
Since World War II the United States has again demonstrated its
technological ability by pioneering in the development of marine nuclear
propulsion, and new methods of cargo handling such as container ships,
roll-on-roll-of f vessels, the LASH system, the SEABEE system, and the
integration of these new marine transportation systems with shore trans-
portation to form an intermodal system concept.
In 1968, with a new Administration at the helm, a complete re-
evaluation of the merchant marine was undertaken resulting in a
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commitment to again revitalize our fleet. The Maritime Administration
increased its research budget from a 1969 level of $6.7 million to a
requested $20.7 million in 1971. It also has developed twenty new ship
designs using the latest techniques. The shipbuilding industry invested
$200 million in capitol improvements in 1969-1970 compared to $579 mil-
lion between 1958 and 1969 . Today we have a few of the finest ships
on the high seas. The Administration requested and the Congress passed
the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. The commitment is to build a modern
fleet capable of carrying 30% of the U.S. foreign trade by 1980. To do
this requires the construction of 300 new ships over the next ten years.
Each modern ship is expected to be the equivalent of three ships it is
replacing. Combined with 150 ships of recent construction, we should




Government policies in the past failed to achieve their objec-
tives because of poor programs, lack of consistent support, lack of
flexibility in meeting changing conditions, and lack of adequate
funding. The question is whether or not this new commitment will be
sustained through the 70' s, or will it evaporate in a few years as it




Merchant Marine Act of 1936
A basic knowledge of the laws that affect the merchant marine
industry is required in order to gain a better understanding of the
challenges and opportunities facing the industry today. The primary
law that supports the industry is the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The
law was passed in an attempt to discourage the decline of the merchant
marine which was caused by numerous problems, the most important of
which were increasing shipbuilding and wage costs which were pricing
the industry out of competition with foreign flags.
The Merchant Marine Act, in its Declaration of Policy, stated
that the policy of this country was to maintain a merchant marine con-
structed, owned, and manned by the United States, so as never to be at
the mercy of foreign ships or shipyards. That an efficient and econ-
omical merchant marine of sufficient size to meet all of this country's
domestic water-borne traffic, a substantial portion of its foreign trade
and the capability of supporting the armed forces in time of national
emergency was essential to our national security. Some important pro-
visions of the original Act were as follows:
Maritime Commission - Title II provided for the establishment of the
United States Maritime Commission. This Commission was abolished in
1950 and its functions transferred to a Federal Maritime Board and the
Secretary of Commerce. The Board was replaced in 1961 by the Federal
Maritime Commission. The Commission's functions include the regulation
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and control of rates, services, practices, and agreements of common
carriers by water and of other persons affecting shipping in domestic
and foreign trade.
Construction - Differential Subsidy - Title V provided for the construc-
tion by American citizens in the United States of cargo liners and
passenger ships. The purpose of the subsidy was to stimulate construc-
tion in U.S. shipyards by paying for the difference in the cost of con-
struction in foreign yards. It allowed a maximum subsidy of 55% for
cargo liners and 60% for passenger ships.
Section 509 provided that any citizen may apply for a loan to
construct a new vessel. A purchaser not receiving a subsidy is required
to pay to the Secretary of Commerce not less than 12.5% and a purchaser
receiving a subsidy, 25%, of the unsubsidized cost of the vessel. The
balance to be paid in not over twenty-five years in equal annual in-
stallments at an interest rate established by the Secretary of the
Treasury.
Section 511 permits the establishment of a non-taxable construc-
tion reserve fund for the construction, reconstruction, or acquisition
of a vessel within a certain time period. The fund to be composed of
deposits of proceeds from sales of vessels, earnings from the operation
of vessels and receipts in the form of interest or otherwise, with re-
spect to amounts previously deposited. The allowable depreciation on
the ship is reduced by the amount of the reserve fund.
Operating - Differential Subsidy - Title VI authorized and directed the
Secretary of Commerce to consider the application of any citizen for
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financial aid in the operation of a vessel in the foreign commerce of
the country to make them competitive with foreign operators. The amount
of subsidy was to be based on the difference between the fair and reason-
able cost of insurance, maintenance, repairs, wages, and subsistence,
and the cost of the same items if operated under foreign registry. One-
half of any excess profit over 10% was to be recaptured by the govern-
ment.
Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance - Title XI allows the Secretary of
Commerce to insure the interest on and unpaid balance of the principal
on certain ship mortgages and loans and to fix a premium for the in-
surance within specified guidelines.
Even though the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 has resulted in the
expenditure by the government of over $5 billion in the form of subsidies,
the decline of our Merchant Marine continued. The purpose of the Act
has not been questioned, however the manner of achieving its goals has
been the center of controversy since its inception, particularly the
subsidy provision. One viewpoint is that the merchant marine and ship-
building industries dependence on subsidy has fostered outmoded and un-
economical practices. This is evidenced by the following statement of
former Secretary of Transportation Alan S. Boyd presented before the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the U. S. Senate on May 10, 1968:
"Enduring through the years as a tradition, the merchant
marine has declined as an industry. Its decline parallels its
increasing dependence on Government support through subsidies
of one kind or another. Subsidies - direct and indirect -
have been a compromise answer to a difficult situation. They
have prevented both the death and the nationalization of the
merchant marine.
The subsidy system itself is in clear need of reform.
Instead of encouraging innovation and productivity, the
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system focuses attention on the subsidy dollar as a source
of income. A new system must be found that will induce the
industry to take full advantage of advancing technology,
management ingenuity, and the resources of a skilled labor
force."
Furthermore, the Act was applicable only to cargo liners and
passenger vessels. In the 1930' s there was only a small tanker and bulk
carrier fleet, tramp shipping was expected to soon disappear, and gov-
ernment shipping was very small. Since then, our foreign bulk carrier
trade has risen to over 200 million tons per year and tanker trade to
over 150 million tons per year, and the U. S. Government is the world's
largest shipper
Until 1970 the Act remained essentially unchanged despite these
tremendous changes in U. S. trade. Then a long overdue attempt to cor-
rect the inadequacies of the original Act was made with the passage of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, Public Law 91-469. Whether this is the
proper corrective action is not the purpose of this discussion, however,
a look at some of its provisions and how it modified the original Act is
of value.
Merchant Marine Act of 1970
The purpose of this new Act is to correct the deficiencies of the
past with the goal of having U. S. flag operators carrying 30% of our
total foreign commerce and 50% of our liner trade. This is to be accom-
plished by the expenditure over the next ten years of $4.5 billion for
the construction of 300 ships. Some important amendments that this Bill
makes to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 are as follows:
Construction - Differential Subsidy - This section of the Act is amended
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to allow bulk carriers, tankers, and other vessels to be eligible for a
construction subsidy. Also, the amount of subsidy is to be reduced in
stages from the 55% previously permitted to 35% in fiscal year 1976. The
purpose of this reduction is to foster improvements in the industry and
lessen its dependence on government subsidy.
Operating - Differential Subsidy - The new Act extended to tankers and
bulk carriers the provisions of this section and also permitted the pay-
ment of subsidies for certain cases of foreign port to foreign port
voyages. In addition, it allows bulk carriers who now own foreign flag
vessels to participate in the operating subsidy program provided they
agree to purchase no new vessels for their foreign-flag operations, and
to divest themselves of their present foreign holdings within twenty
years.
Furthermore, the new Act changes the way by which the subsidy
is calculated. In the past, the government was placed in the position
of paying all wage and benefit changes negotiated by management and
labor, although it had no voice in the bargaining. Under the new pro-
gram wages and benefit payments are based on costs incurred by foreign
competitors adjusted by a national wage benefit index to reflect wage
level trends of other sections of the U. S. economy. Thus encouraging
operators to hold wage and benefit payments within the index level.
The recapture provision of the original Act was eliminated.
Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance - The ceiling on the amount of insurance
the Maritime Administration can write was raised to $3 billion.
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THE STATUS OF A NUCLEAR MERCHANT MARINE
The N.S. SAVANNAH
After World War II, scientists and engineers began thinking about
using nuclear energy at sea. Imagination turned to reality with the
launching of the first nuclear powered ship, the USS NAUTILUS (SSN 571),
in 1954. Following in her footsteps, President Eisenhower proposed in
1955 that the United States build the world's first nuclear powered
merchant ship to demonstrate America's intentions for the peaceful use
of nuclear energy. The ship was not intended to prove or disprove the
economics of marine nuclear propulsion, but was to help identify, define,
and solve problems of design, operation, and manning to benefit future
ships. Congress agreed with the President and passed Public Law 848 on
July 30, 1956, which added a new Section 716 to the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936. On October 15, 1956, the President directed the construction
of the N.S. SAVANNAH as a joint project of the Maritime Administration
and the Atomic Energy Commission.
The keel of the SAVANNAH was laid on May 22, 1958, and she was
launched on July 21, 1959, being christened by Mrs. Eisenhower. Her
reactor first went critical on December 21, 1961, and attained 100%
power on April 4, 1962. The ship was designed by George G. Sharp, Inc.,
built by New York Shipbuilding Corporation, and her nuclear reactor was









Cargo Capacity 9,300 tons
Displacement 20,000 tons
Cruising Speed 21 knots
Power 22,000 SHP
Reactor 80 MWt
Core Life 15,600 EFPH
The Maritime Administration had contracted with the States Marine
Line of New York to operate the SAVANNAH as part of its fleet. On May 1,
1962 the ship was delivered to her operators. Her maiden voyage was made
from Savannah, Georgia in August 1962, sailing to Norfolk, Virginia, then
through the Panama Canal to various west coast ports. In March 1963, she
tied up at Galveston, Texas where the Maritime Administration had estab-
lished service facilities, for inspections and planned modifications.
She was then to sail to Europe. However, labor disputes arose between
the deck and engineers unions and the operating engineers went on strike.
The dispute could not be settled and as a result, a new general agent
was named, America Export Isbrandtsen Lines, and a new crew was trained.
In May 1964 the SAVANNAH finally made her first transatlantic crossing.
During her demonstration voyages, she made a total of ten crossings
visiting more than a dozen European ports, she steamed 89,818 miles,
and stopped at a total of 46 ports. In August 1965, the SAVANNAH was
placed in commercial service by First Atomic Ship Transport, Inc. (FAST),




On March 1, 1967 In hearings before the Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine, House of Representatives, the then acting Secretary of Commerce,
Alexander B. Trowbridge, proposed the withdrawal of the SAVANNAH from
service and stated:
"The SAVANNAH has not been and cannot be for the fore-
seeable future operated so as to show a profit or merely to
break even. You will recall that the SAVANNAH is a combin-
ation passenger-cargo vessel. In practical financial terms,
the fact that a significant portion of the space on board can-
not be utilized to haul cargo makes losses larger than they
would otherwise be, if the vessel was designed for all-
cargo operations.
Experimental operation of the SAVANNAH, under commer-
cial conditions, will have been sufficient to establish -
without need for further commercial operations at a signif-
icant financial loss - the feasibility of a nuclear-powered
merchant ship. We do not believe that the continued exper-
imental operation of the SAVANNAH is needed or will produce
additional research value sufficient to offset the continuing
heavy operating deficit. For this reason, we do not propose
to continue it in operation beyond this August."
However, because the SAVANNAH'S first core had not been depleted,
and many foreign ports, particularly in the Far East, had not been visit-
ed, and because of the support for the program by the ship's operators,
many congressmen, and the merchant marine industry in general, the
proposal was rejected.
By July 1970 the SAVANNAH had visited a total of seventy-seven
ports in twenty-six countries and twenty-one states and territories of
the United States. She had carried cargo on a commercial basis to
thirty-seven foreign and thirteen domestic ports, and had sailed to the
Far East three, times calling at Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
The ship had made a total of 737 reactor start-ups, steamed 454,675 miles
with a reactor plant at sea availability of 99.8%, meeting all advanced
schedules without a single plant failure. In all, she consumed 75 Kg of
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U-235, the equivalent of 28,800,000 gallons of fuel oil. The ship's
total cost was about $100 million, including ship construction and op-
eration, the establishment of training facilities at King's Point, New
York, the training of her crews, and the construction of service facil-
ities at Galveston.
The SAVANNAH program has proven the technical feasibility and
safety of a nuclear powered merchant ship, won acceptance at home and
at most foreign ports, demonstrated the capability of a nuclear vessel
to maintain schedules, established a servicing facility for future nu-
clear powered ships, established a training program for future nuclear
powered ship operators, made practical the development of numerous tech-
nical and economic studies to explore the future use of nuclear propul-
sion, and has given us valuable knowledge concerning the economics of
nuclear ships. The SAVANNAH accomplished her objectives, although there
are many problems that remain to be solved, such as insurance consider-
ations, and labor disputes.
In 1971 Congress was unwilling to continue supporting the ship.
Alternative proposals to convert her to a container ship or an LPG
carrier, or to turn her over to the Navy for conversion to an oceano-
graphic research vessel or a destroyer tender have not been successful,
even though a second core is available and would be transferred with the
ship without cost. Thus on April 1, 1971 work began at Galveston to
take her out of service, she was defueled in September 1971 and will be




Not since President Eisenhower signed the bill authorizing the
construction of the N.S. SAVANNAH has an important piece of legislation
relating to the development of a nuclear powered merchant marine been
passed. The government's attitude since 1955 has been variable.
Congress - The Committee of Commerce of the Senate and the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House have held numerous hearings
on the status of the merchant marine and have introduced bills foster-
ing the development of a nuclear powered merchant marine. However,
none of these bills have been passed.
A recent bill, H.R. 8201, introduced by Mr, Downing, is similar
to bills previously introduced into the House and Senate and contains
the following provisions:
This bill amends Title X of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and
allows the Secretary of Commerce to grant aid for the development, con-
struction, and operation of nuclear powered merchant ships whose design
embodies a significant departure from the design of existing nuclear
powered merchant ships which may lead to a significant reduction in the
cost of constructing or operating future nuclear powered merchant ships.
The amount of aid to be as follows:
To pay the contractor all of, or part of, the excess of the cost
of developing the proposed ship over the estimated fair and reasonable
cost of developing a comparable conventional ship. And to pay the con-
tractor all of, or part of, the excess of the cost of constructing the
proposed ship in the United States over the estimated fair and reasonable
cost of constructing a comparable conventional ship in the United States.
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In addition, the Atomic Energy Commission could waive or reduce
the charges for the use of source and special nuclear materials for not
exceeding the first five years of operation, could assist in training of
the crew of the ship, conduct studies and assist in the planning and de-
signing of shore service facilities, make available appropriate classi-
fied material, provide research and development in Government labora-
tories, design review service, ship construction inspection services,
and ship operation advisory service
Administration - Action by the administrations since 1955 on the devel-
opment of a nuclear powered merchant marine has been negligible. The
attitude in 1968 can be ascertained from the statement of Secretary of
Transportation Boyd before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the
Senate:
"There is serious doubt as to the attractiveness and
wisdom of proceeding with a broader nuclear ship program
at the present time. It appears that power reactors of
the relatively small sizes required for merchant ship
propulsion will continue to be noncompetitive with oil
over the foreseeable future." 25
There appears to be more interest by the present Administration.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 demonstrates the Administration's com-
mitment to an improvement of our maritime posture, however, the word
nuclear appears nowhere in the Act, thus it is not specifically foster-
ed but neither is it rejected. During the summer of 1971, the Adminis-
tration conducted several hearings at which the Maritime Administration
presented its case for the development of a nuclear merchant marine,
however, no decision has yet been forthcoming.
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Atomic Energy Commission - In a report, prepared jointly in November
1967 by the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and the
Atomic Energy Commission, for the Committee on Commerce, United States
Senate the following recommendations were made:
"1. The Federal Government should take an active role in a
development program leading to economically competitive nu-
clear powered merchant ships.
2. The Department of Commerce and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission assisted by the Department of Defense and the
President's scientific advisor, should cooperate in the
establishment of a construction and research and develop-
ment program to implement the following policy:
(a) The Department of Commerce and industry, with
Atomic Energy Commission support, should proceed immedi-
ately with the construction of two to four large, high-
speed (27 to 30 knots) fast turnaround nuclear-powered
ships utilizing commercially available nuclear powerplant
technology in an integrated transportation system to be
privately owned and in operation by 1972.
(b) The Department of Commerce and the Atomic Energy
Commission should proceed in an orderly fashion with a re-
search and development program including a Government-owned,
land-based test facility for an advanced reactor for nuclear-
powered merchant ships.
3. For the recommended nuclear fleet, legislation should
be provided to permit the Federal Government to pay the ex-
cess design, development, construction, and operating costs
due to this initial application of nuclear reactor propul-
sion plants."
However, the AEC never requested funds to proceed with the pro-
gram and apparently changed its opinion. For in May 1968 Mr. George
Kavanagh, Assistant General Manager for Reactors, in a statement before
the Committee on Commerce said:
"For the reasons described above, we believe that a broad
nuclear merchant ship program should not proceed at this time




Maritime Administration - The opinion of the Maritime Administration in
1968 is revealed in the following statement which appeared at the con-
clusion of a report to Congress:
"It is urgent that this first U.S. nuclear merchant
fleet be built promptly, taking full advantage of the mari-
time reactor technology as it exists today. If we delay,
the U.S. lead in nuclear maritime propulsion, and high-
speed liner service will have passed to Germany, Japan and
other countries with firm plans to build nuclear ships more
advanced than the SAVANNAH, and vessels as fast as any pres-
ently contemplated for the U.S. merchant marine." 6
"The Maritime Administration has supported a number of studies on
the development of a nuclear powered merchant ship. The results of sev-
eral of these reports are given below:
In a report titled, "Importance of an American High Speed Nuclear
Ship Program," prepared by the Maritime Administration in 1965, the fol-
lowing recommendations were made.
"It is recommended that the Maritime Administration:
(1) Propose, initiate, and expedite a high speed nuclear
ship program.
(2) Initiate immediate and close liaison with the Atomic
Energy Commission to determine in detail the most economic
and expedient program for:
(a) the required engineering, research, and develop-
ment of a compact maritime PWR for immediate applica-
tion;
(b) the continued improvement of the design of the
compact PWR;
(c) the development of a further advanced plant
capable of widespread application in the merchant
marine.
(3) Begin exploratory discussions with the operators who
have expressed or who might express an interest in investing
in such ships on routes which have potential for high speed
nuclear powered ships, starting with AEIL's current proposal
for immediate operation of the SAVANNAH on TR 12 followed by




In 1968, General Dynamics completed an extensive report titled,
"Advanced Nuclear Cargo Ship Study." In summary the report compared
two systems, one consisting of three high speed nuclear powered contain-
er ships, the other, three conventionally powered container ships of the
same speed and capacity, operating on Trade Route 12. The results based
on a cash flow analysis showed the rates of return on the owner's equity
after taxes to be:
Rate of Return
I Nuclear Not Government Supported -2%
II Fossil Fuel Unsubsidized +18%
III Nuclear, supported under legislation
similar to H.R. 8201 discussed
previously 35%
IV Fossil fuel subsidized at 55% its
construction and design costs 30%
The report thus shows a nuclear powered merchant ship to be un-
economical without the government support proposed in H.R. 8201.
The latest thinking of the Maritime Administration is revealed by
Mr. Marvin Pitkin, Assistant Administrator for Research and Development,
in the "Marine Nuclear Steam Propulsion Executive Briefing," presented
in 1971, in which he stated in summary:
1. World trade is rapidly increasing.
2. To meet the demand of this increasing trade has required a drastic
increase in ship speed and size.
3. Increased speed and size necessitates increased power from approxi-
mately 20,000 SHP a decade ago to 120,000 SHP for vessels now underway.
4. The world market for high speed powered ships is expected to be
about 2,500 in the next two decades.
5. A 10% penetration of this market would mean about $5 billion in the
U.S. balance of payments.
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6. Fuel cost is now more important than in the past. A 100,000 SHP
ship would consume on the order of $100 million worth of fuel over twenty
five years. Concurrently with the increase in power demand, fossil fuel
prices have risen whereas nuclear fuel costs have tended to decrease.
7. As ship's horsepower is increased, nuclear propulsion becomes rela-
tively more economical than fossil fuel systems. Nuclear ship reactors
are economically competitive today in the 100 to 120,000 SHP range and
will become more competitive in the future at lower power levels,
Mr. Pitkin completed his presentation with the following state-
ment
"In summary, we have concluded that the time has come
for maritime nuclear propulsion in the U.S. and have applied
ourselves to the task of formulating a program in the nation's
interests. The 1950 's were characterized by the initiation of
the U.S. nuclear industry for land-based power and naval re-
actor applications. The 1960 's produced the necessary demon-
stration of technical and operational feasibility of maritime
nuclear propulsion. We see the 70' s as the decade in which
to demonstrate economic feasibility, and in the 80 's and
beyond, we foresee development and exploitation of world-
wide markets as nuclear propulsion penetrates into world
fleet applications."
INDUSTRIES ' INTEREST
American Export Isbrandtsen Line has been the only company to
make a request for the construction of a nuclear powered merchant ship.
They proposed to build three high speed container ships for operation on
Trade Route 12, The proposal was based on the assumption that the House
Bill, H.R. 766, similar to H.R. 8201 discussed previously, would be
available. Since the bill never passed, the ships were not built.
The Maritime Administration has surveyed ship operators concerning
their interest in nuclear power and in general received an affirmative




Babcock and Wilcox, Combustion Engineering, Westinghouse Electric,
General Electric, and United Nuclear Corporations have made studies re-
lating to reactors for ships, however, only B & W has maintained a con-
tinuing interest. After building the power plant for the SAVANNAH,
B & W developed a second generation system, an integral reactor concept
the CNSG-I (Consolidated Nuclear Steam Generator). However, in 1966
when government funding for the nuclear maritime program was reduced,
the company licensed its design to Germany for the N.S. OTTO HAHN, and
later to Japan for the N.S. MUTSU. This resulted in a reduction of
their development effort by about five years. The license agreement
did, however, make available to B & W the results of the OTTO HAHN
project. Aided by the experience gained on the OTTO HAHN, and the dem-
onstrated feasibility of the integrated plant design, B & W developed
the CNSG-IV, a 120,000 SHP power plant and they are designing a
240,000 SHP integral plant for the Maritime Administration. The Mari-
time Administration is now sponsoring a continuing development program
with Babcock and Wilcox and General Electric aimed at offering a com-
petitive nuclear ship system in 1973.
In the most recent economic study sponsored by the Maritime Ad-
ministration and conducted jointly by a Naval Architect, Babcock and
Wilcox and General Electric, the following result was obtained:
In the summer of 1971 Bunker "C" was selling for about $3.50 a
barrel. With maritime nuclear fuel at an expected 1.5 mils per SHP-hr







Germany - The Federal Republic of Germany is pursuing a vigorous program
of research and development, and is currently operating the world's only
operational nuclear powered merchant ship, the N.S. OTTO HAHN (See Table
2). The construction cost of the ship, excluding fuel, was $14 million.
The ship was built between 1963 and 1968 and has been operating for the
past three years for the purpose of gaining experience and collecting










Crew (including trainees) 61
Research Personnel 35
Reactor
Design Pressure 1,209 psi
Design Temperature 572 degrees F.
Operating Pressure 903 psi
Inlet/Outlet Temperature 513/533 degrees F.
Thermal Output 38 MWt
EFPD 500






Secondary Steam Pressure 441 psi
Feedwater Temperature 365 degrees F.
Steam Temperature 523 degrees F.
Superheat 65 degrees F.
The owner of the ship, G.K.S.S., is a company that was formed in
1957 specifically for the purpose of promoting the application of nuclear
power for ship propulsion. Partners in the company are the Federal
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Republic of Germany, the four northern German provinces, and thirty-
four industrial and commercial companies.
The nuclear steam supply system is of the Babcock and Wilcox in-
tegral reactor design licensed to Germany in 1966. Under the terms of
the agreement, the Atomic Energy Commission was to lease the first core
and provide information on the SAVANNAH, in return they were to receive
detailed information on the OTTO HAHN project.
The ship and reactor installation are equipped with additional
measuring devices and research facilities to provide the technical and
practical knowledge necessary for the design of future ships.
The reactor first went critical on August 26, 1968, and reached
full power on October 12, 1968. The ship operated in the Baltic until
February 1969, then began worldwide trial voyages. By mid 1970 she had
steamed over 70,000 miles with a reactor plant availability of nearly
100%. The reactor system with self pressurization proved to be extra-
2 2
ordinarily stable and met or surpassed all design parameters
On the performance of the ship, Mr. D. Ulken, Director of the
Institute of Nuclear Ship Propulsion, G.K.S.S., stated:
"The author would like to state that the trial voyages
with OTTO HAHN so far have shown that the principle of the
advanced pressurized water reactor is well suited to marine
service in the propulsion system of merchant ships. The be-
havior of the plant in heavy seas and under extreme climatic
conditions has exceeded the expectations of both the builder
and the operator. It appears, therefore, that the develop-
ment and research on this reactor design, as is done in
Germany at present, is particularly promising. The author
expects that intensive detail work on this kind of reactor
will lead to the production of an economic marine reactor
of the power needed nowadays for merchant ships. Conven-
tional ships have already reached a power range in which
nuclear propulsion should be economically competitive. The
experience gained with OTTO HAHN shows that nuclear ships
can be as simple and reliable as conventional merchant
ships. The advanced pressurized water reactor with its
self-adjusting control will perhaps be better suited for
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overall automatic control than the conventional boilers."
The Germans are planning new construction and in mid 1969 an-
nounced plans for a 215,000 ton nuclear oil/bulk/ore carrier, however,
construction has not yet started 1 .
Japan - The Japanese have an aggressive nuclear merchant ship develop-
ment program with one ship under construction, the N.S. MUTSU, primarily
a research and training ship. Her keel was laid in November 1968 and
she was launced in June 1969, with an expected completion date in 1972.
The MUTSU' s reactor is a 36 MWt CNSG design licensed from Babcock and
Wilcox. The ship will have 10,000 SHP, a speed of 16.5 knots, and a
crew of fifty-nine with accommodations for twenty research workers.
Japan foresees considerable growth in nuclear power as shown by
the following excerpt from the Japan Atomic Energy Forum's Nuclear Ship
Study Group Report (March 1971)
:
"If we dare to estimate the number of nuclear powered
ships to be built during thirty years to come up to 2000
about two of eighteen container ships planned to be built
in 1980 are expected to be super high-speed nuclear powered
ships. In 1990 about ten nuclear powered vessels will be
built against twenty-three container ships and these figures
will be about twenty against twenty-nine in 2000. By
2000, Japan will have approximately 280 nuclear powered
ships in total, including container and other kinds of
nuclear powered ships."
The Japanese and Germans have recently been working out the de-
tails on a plan to build two 80,000 SHP container ships jointly. Japan




Italy - Italy has plans for the construction of a research vessel, the
ENRICO FERMI, to be operated by the Italian Navy. She is to be powered
by an 80 MWt , PWR, developing 22,000 SHP. A prototype reactor has begun
operation. The French Atomic Energy Commission has been contracted to
supply 5,000 Kg of enriched uranium for the ENRICO FERMI 18 .
United Kingdom - In a document titled, "Report on the Nuclear Ship Study"
prepared by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1971, the recommenda-
tion was made not to appropriate money for the research, development,
and construction of a nuclear powered merchant ship at this time, but to
use other nations' research if at a later date nuclear power becomes
economically feasible. The study arrived at the following conclusion:
"Nuclear propulsion for merchant ships could possibly
become competitive in the following circumstances:
(i) if the price of fuel oil rises by some 70% to
200% in real terms above the 1969 level; or
(ii) if there is a dramatic improvement in the per-
formance of nuclear reactors for use at sea, leading
to a reduction of at least 50% both in the capital
costs of reactors and in nuclear fuel; or
(iii) any equivalent combination of the above factors."
Soviet Union - The Soviet Union has been operating the world's first
nuclear powered ice breaker in the N.S. LENIN for about ten years. Two
advanced nuclear powered ice breakers are under construction. Their




To develop a viable and economic merchant marine capable of
meeting this country's needs will require forward looking people apply-
ing the most advanced technology to allow us to become competitive. This
appears to be happening in at least the area of material handling,
where container ships and the LASH system are replacing the old, inef-
ficient, labor intensive, general cargo ship with the new capital
intensive vessels. Surplanting those areas of high cost where we cannot
compete, i.e., labor costs, with high cost capital investment in which
we can compete. However, we are failing to develop along with these
systems the advanced power plants needed for the high speed service that
is coming into existence now. Are we going to repeat the errors of the
past, when we pioneered in steam propulsion and scheduled sailings of
ships, then dropped the effort in favor of the cheaper sailing ships,
with the resulting British dominance of the merchant marine industry for
over seventy-five years? Is the name SAVANNAH going to represent an-
other time when the United States fails to carry on the development
effort it pioneered? This time, however, we will not be losing to the
British, but to the Germans and Japanese. It is time for industry and
the government to join forces in an effort to develop and build a
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The refueling sequence can be divided into the following phases:
Preparation - The reactor plant is shut down, cooled down, depressurized,
and decay heat removal procedures are initiated. Required radiological
containments and controls are established. The pressure vessel water
level is lowered to the desired level. The containment closure head is
unbolted and removed. The external parts of the control rod mechanisms
are removed and the control rods are uncoupled from their drive mecha-
nisms. Electrical leads to incore instrumentation and any other equip-
ment that penetrates or is attached to the pressure vessel head is
removed.
Reactor Vessel Head Removal - The hold down bolts and bolting ring are
removed. A seal weld cutting machine is installed and the seal weld is
cut. Radiological containment required for head removal is installed
and the head removed to storage where the closure seal is renewed and
any head restoration work performed.
Reactor Internals Removal - The control rod grid assembly is removed
along with the core hold-down devices and baffles.
Fuel Transfer - The rotating index shield is installed on the reactor
vessel flange. The fuel transfer cask is positioned over the index
port, the fuel element is engaged and raised into the cask. The cask
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closure door is shut, cooling water is connected to the cask if required,
and the loaded cask is transferred to the storage pool where the fuel
element is lowered into the pool. A new fuel element is raised into
the cask, the cask transferred to the index shield and the fuel element
lowered into the core. The sequence is repeated until fuel transfer is
completed. The refueling equipment is then removed.
Reactor Internals Replaced - Those internals removed are now reinstalled.
Reactor Vessel Head Replacement - The reactor vessel head is positioned
on the reactor vessel and the head seal welded. The bolting ring is
installed followed by the hold down studs.
Complete Reactor Preparations - The control rods are coupled to the lead
screw and the rod drive mechanisms are reinstalled. Electrical leads
and all other attachments to the pressure vessel head are completed.
The containment head is installed and bolted.
Pre-Critical Tests - The pressure vessel is filled and vented. Any re-
quired flushes of piping are performed and the plant is hydrostatically
tested. The containment vessel is leak tested. The control rods are
individually tested.
Critical Tests - Take the reactor critical and perform low power physics
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a nuclear powered anH
fossil fueled container
ship.

